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The changed economic environment seriously affected the Italian banking system creating the 
conditions for the entrance in a troubled period for the financial institutions. Italy was not the 
only country which suffered this banking crisis, but even other European countries were 
seriously affected and the answer to this period of high stress for the banks, in many cases, 
was the state intervention. The European legislator to get a higher harmonization between 
member countries introduced a new set of rules to apply in case of bank bailout. In recent 
years, the Italian institutions intervened several times to bailout banks, but a part of the 
interventions applied after the introduction of the new European rules affecting the measures 
adopted by Italy. This created a condition of uncertainty on the measures to apply and the 
effect was to have different paths to save a bank. 
In this thesis we study the methods through which the Italian institutions bailout the banks, 
analyzing the instruments and mechanisms adopted. The comprehension of this help us in 
considering the driving causes of the financial troubles suffered by the rescued banks. What is 
relevant is to specify that we consider the interventions happened after the introduction of the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. This condition is an element of innovation because 
we study bailouts occurred under these new rules set that will affect rescue interventions in 
the next future. In this work the main goal is to consider if the causes which led to bailout 
were solved after the intervention of the Italian institutions, observing the changes in the 
financial statements of the banks which were affected by rescue operations. In this work we 
deepen the bailout policies put in practice and we try to achieve conclusions useful for futures 
interventions adopted to rescue banks. 
From what defined above, the object of our study are eleven Italian banks which were subject 
to different bailout methods. The causes which led these institutions to financial troubles are 
rooted on the traditional business, based on interests on loans rather than fees and 
commissions. For nine of the banks rescued, the solutions adopted involved the end of their 
activities because they were sold to other Italian banking groups. To discover the ex-post 
impact of the bailout it was not possible to observe the banks subsequently the interventions, 
for this the analysis was addressed to the buyer banks. From the analysis of the financial 
statements there is evidence that the buyer banks are undertaking a path to go away from the 
traditional business model, and the intervention to bailout problematic banks did not affect 
this path. Only one buyer bank showed results different from his past and from other banks, 
but it is not possible to conduct these results exclusively to the operation with the rescued 
banks, because this accomplished several other M&A operations in the same period.  
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The structure of the present work is based on five chapters. Chapter 1, it is introduced the 
argument with a general view of the Italian banking sector and a brief explanation of the most 
relevant rules. Chapter 2, the rules and rescue mechanisms are deeply showed with a 
presentation of the most relevant literature to define the research question. Chapter 3, the 
banks rescued are reported with the methods used to bailout them and it is explained the 
research methodology. Chapter 4, it is conducted the analysis to discover the causes which led 
to the state intervention and the ex-post effect of the bailout. Chapter 5, here the results are 






















Chapter 1: The framework of 2016-2018 Italian bank bailout 
 
The European bank sector was seriously affected by the long and severe crises started in the 
2008 in the US. The Italian bank system was not excessively hit by the Great Recession 
thanks to a limited exposure to structured securities and to a traditional business model of 
intermediation. The main problems for the Italian banks raised with the sovereign debt crises 
of the 2011. This led to a difficulty for the banks to collect money especially from companies 
and to a reduction of interest margin, putting the financial institutions and their businesses in a 
dangerous condition. It is important to specify the all the European bank sector suffered the 
sovereign debt crises and this may be proved by the many state interventions around our 
continent (Lusignani, 2013). At the end of 2016, the impact on public debt for measures to 
rescue the financial sector amounted to: 227 billion in Germany (7,2% of German GDP), 101 
in the United Kingdom (4,3% of UK GDP), 58 in Ireland (22%), 52 in Spain (4,6%), 33 in 
Austria (9,5%), 23 in Netherlands (3,2%) (Commissione di inchiesta, 2018). However, the 
object of this thesis is not the European context but to focus on the Italian bank bailout. 
Specifically, we present what happened to banks before to be touched by the bailout and, 
above all, we analyze what changed to the financial institutions in the ex-post rescue phase. 
Essentially, we try to discover the main problems related to financial institutions which were 
subjected of a rescue plan by the state and then focus on the subsequent phase, studying if 
there were any impact on the banks. 
Chapter 1 offers an overview of the Italian bank sector when it was hit by the sovereign debt 
crisis considering: GDP, composition of financial investments, information about NPL. It is 
viewed then the new rule set about the bank bailouts to understand the role of different 
authorities and to give a little of knowledge useful for the rest of the thesis. As a last point is 
analyzed a short case study in order to understand how the recent law modified the state 
intervention. 
 
1.1: The effects of the Sovereign debt crisis on the Italian bank sector 
The starting point to understand the difficulties of the Italian bank sector is the financial 
global crises the worst since the Great Depression of 1929. The effects of the crises were deep 
and amplified by the diffusion of structured securities based on subprime mortgages 
securitization. The Italian bank sector was hit even harder than other European countries 
during the crisis, but the recovery was better than the euro area, where many state 
interventions were necessary (Visco, 2018).  
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What helped Italian banks to avoid the hard consequences of the crises was mainly their 
business model focused on a traditional intermediation between families and companies and 
so a limited exposure on the activity of investment banking (Lusignani, 2013). 
In the second half of 2009 a global recovery started, but in Europe a new crisis was ready to 
appear, the sovereign debt crises. This crisis exploded with the knowledge of the real 
conditions of the Greece financial position at the end of 2010. The impact of this new crises in 
Italy started in the summer of 2011 where the spread between the yield on the 10-year Italian 
government bond and the corresponding German one rapidly increases, reaching a peak of 
550 basis points in November 2011 (Albertazzi et al., 2014). In our country, the crisis was 
deeper than in the rest of Europe and from the second quarter of 2011 and the first of 2013 the 
GDP decreased of 500 basis points. This double recession was the worst economic crises of 
Italian history, much deeper than the Great Depression (Visco, 2017).  
The main consequence of a reduction on the GDP was the rise of the ratio public debt and 
GDP, which overcome 130% as it is possible to see in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1: Italian GDP (right axis) and public debt/GDP (left axis)-Source: Visco (2017) 
 
 
During the financial crisis Italian banks increased the lending standards to household and 
firms, increasing the margins on new business loans but also reducing the availability of 
credit to private sector (Del Giovane et al., 2013). Despite these measures, the non-performing 
loans (NPL) in Italy started to increase as to reach a level of 360 billion gross and 200 billion 
net, the 11% of the Italian bank loans. On the net NPL 90 billion were bad debt, so exposures 
to insolvent parties, while the remaining part were unlikely to pay and past due loans, so 
considered less risky than bad debt. The increase in the NPL was mainly due to loss of quality 
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of the borrowers and, consequently, there was a reduction of loans lending due to an increase 
of standards for the concessions of loans.  
Not only the exposures were affected by the crises but also the ability of the banks to be 
profitable in their businesses. Traditionally Italian banks focused on commercial banking and 
limited their activity on investment banking. This means that banks were more focused on 
taking their profit on the interest margin rather than from bank services. Between the 2007 
and 2012 the interest margin for bank loans reduced a lot, more than 40% (figure 2). This 
contraction was due to a reduction on the ability to collect the interest on NPL and to an 
increase of the cost of funding for the banks. Indeed, bank funding was related with the 
perception of the bank risk. The two relevant factors for considering this risk were the amount 
of NPL and the burden of securities issued by the Italian Government, which were suffering 
the high risk of the state during the sovereign debt crisis. This led to a reduction of the interest 
spread and profitability of the institutions.  
 
Figure 2: Italian interest margin-Source: Lusignani (2013) 
 
1.2: The new rule set about bank crisis management 
Several European governments were forced to rescue troubled banks in their countries during 
the crisis, due to the absence of a common European policy framework for solving the 
banking crisis (De Bruyckere et al., 2013). So, the European legislator create a set of common 
rules along the European Union to unify the laws about banks bailout. In 2015 two different 
European Directives entered into force in all the member states, with the aim to set up a new 
order after the financial crises. The first is the Directive 2014/59, Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD), that gives instruments to solve bank crises. The second is the 
Directive 2014/49 EU, Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD), that has as object the 
protection of savers and the creation of a set of laws more connected through the European 
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Union. This law is not object of a specific discussion in this work, but it was necessary to 
present for the impact that it has on the Deposit Guarantee Scheme that we nominate further 
in the thesis. 
The BRRD started to produce its effect from the 1st January of 2015 introducing the bail-in 
instrument and a National Resolution Fund (NRF) for each member state with the task of 
cover the losses that cannot be faced by shareholders and debtholders during the bail-in 
process. About this process is given a specific examination further in the thesis while in this 
section a deeper analysis is conducted on the funds introduced from the Directive. 
The NRF should gradually enter in the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), a common fund for the 
member countries, created by the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The SRM was 
created with the object to ensure the stability of the Euro area through a centralized process of 
resolution (Bassan, 2017) and it entered in force the 1st January of 2016 and it is composed by 
the National Resolution Authority (NRA), the Italian NRA is the Bank of Italy, and the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB). The latter is a European agency responsible for the resolution 
functions which takes decisions about the resolution plans and that individuates specific 
actions to solve bank crises following the legal discipline. So, we can say that the Single 
Resolution Mechanism has the following objectives: the management of bank crises, ensuring 
that the bank failure does not affect the broader economic context causing financial instability 
and to guarantee minimal costs for taxpayers and real economy. The SRM was built to 
guarantee a common solution to banks in financial trouble and increase the financial stability 
of the member countries. This mechanism is necessary even because there is the risk that the 
EU countries take decisions about the banks’ resolution in contrast between them. It is also 
necessary for the integration of a supervision at a supranational level, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism. As we described NRAs take part to SRM decisions, but it is given also 
responsibility for the management of the less significant banks. In this activity the NRA 
should follow the guidelines set up by SRB which can substitute at any moment the national 
Authorities when it is threatened the harmony of the Mechanism. 
Until now it was given a general description of the mechanism adopted by the European 
Union for managing the bank failure but it worth to know the contribution mechanism 
adopted by SRF and NRF. The member states of EU, as already said, adopted the 1st January 
of 2015 the FNR and they should complete it in 10 years. The target level to cover is at least 
the 1% of the deposits protected by the (DGS) Deposit Guarantee Scheme (deposits until 
100.000 euro). The same calculation is used for the SRF but the amount of DGS considered is 
the sum of the deposit all around EU countries and it should be completed in a shorter time 
period, 8 years. As explained before, the SRF will absorb the NRF in the vision of a future 
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banking union which is slowly but progressively accomplished. The rules to calculate the 
contributions of the banks to the funds were expressed in the Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21st October of 2014. 
It is necessary to give a short overview of past mechanism adopted in Italy to deal with the 
crisis of financial institutions so that it is possible to better understand the implementations 
adopted by this new mechanism. Before the BRRD and the SRM the management of banks 
difficulties was left to Bank of Italy in charge of its responsibility of national Authority and 
the main instruments adopted were liquidazione coatta amministrativa and amministrazione 
straordinaria, these saw a reduction in their use with the new European rule set. The 
amministrazione straordinaria is usually set in order to restore the activity of an institution 
and it is not evidence of insolvency while the liquidazione coatta amministrativais used when 
the bank crisis is considered irreversible and has as last scope the conclusion of the bank 
activity (Castiellod’Antonio, 2016). Moreover, in Italy are still present two funds of deposit 
protection (DGS) which before the BRRD could intervene not only to protect the depositors 
but also to prevent the institutions crises acting as an Institutional Protection Scheme (IPS). 
The first fund is the FITD, which was recognized as a DGS on 10th December of 1996 and it 
is a mandatory consortium formed under private law. The FITD is the only established and 
recognized Italian DGS whose membership is open to banks which are not mutual banks. The 
second is Fondo di Garanzia dei Deposanti del Credito Cooperativo (FGDCC), a statutory 
DGS whose membership is only open to, and mandatory for, mutual banks.  
However, the actual rules introduced made less powerful the intervention of the DGS. Further 
in chapter 2, it is given a specific view of the functioning of the rules and funds until now 
described and their connection with the Italian law. 
 
1.2.1: Tercas case 
The mechanisms and rules described above are complicated and as it happened their 
intervention are not so clear. This is what occurred with the management of the crises with an 
Italian bank called Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Teramo S.p.A. (Tercas). In this 
paragraph, it is shown the process and the different interventions to deal with the difficulties 
of this financial institution. It is important to write about it because in rescuing this institution 
was applied a method that one year and a half after was considered inappropriate by the 
European authorities. The method was considered inadequate considering the rules which 
entered in force only after the decision to intervene to help this bank. So, the particularity 
about this intervention was the change of the method used to help the bank through the 
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retroactivity application of the BRRD. Indeed, the bank entered in crisis and was saved before 
the introduction of the new rule set. It is relevant to report about it because it gives a vision of 
how the new rules have changed the past ways to intervene but also because it describes the 
processes used to rescue a bank, giving us a first example of how the authorities act in 
banking crisis. Moreover, it is particularly relevant for the thesis because after this case for all 
the subsequent banking interventions were adopted the new rules introduced with the BRRD. 
So, Tercas sets the time threshold in order to choose the banks analyzed in the present work, 
because in this thesis we focus on the bank bailout placed on the new context used to save 
banks 
 
Tercas is a holding company operating in Abruzzo region and the main shareholder was 
Fondazione Tercas owning a 65% stake. In 2011 Tercas acquired a 90% stake of Banca 
Caripe S.p.A, located in the same region of Tercas. In order to give a dimensional measure the 
number of Tercas employees were 225 while, in the consolidated balance sheet, it had 4,5 
billion of net customer loans, 2,7 billion euro of customer deposits and 165 branches. After 
the inspection of Bank of Italy and after it suggestions to the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance on 30th April 2012 Tercas was put by the Minister under special administration 
following the article 70 of the Testo Unico Bancario (Italian Banking Act) (European 
Commission, 2015).  
The first step to try to solve this problem was to consider an intervention of Fondazione 
Tercas or CreditoValtellinese, the main shareholders with respectively the 65% stake and 8% 
stake, for the recapitalization, but they refused. After the main shareholders a third party was 
considered and the figure was represented by Banca Popolare di Bari with a specific request 
during the due diligence on the assets of Tercas and Caripe of full coverage of negative equity 
by the FITD. The FITD (Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi) is, as already said, a 
mandatory fund used as guarantee for the depositors introduced in 1996 and in line with the 
Directive for the Deposit Guarantee Scheme. The next step accomplished by the 
administrators was to submit a request of intervention of 280 million euro for a 
recapitalization to cover negative equity and to acquire impaired assets. The FITD decided to 
intervene in the support of Tercas on 28th October of 2013 and it was next ratified by the 
FITD’s board. Before the intervention, the fund requested authorization from the Bank of 
Italy on 1st July of 2014 and six days later the FITD was authorized to proceed with the 
financial support. On 27th July of 2014 after the shareholders meeting Banca Popolare di Bari 
became the main shareholder. The FITD intervention was a contribution of 265 million euro 
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to cover the negative equity, a guarantee of 35 million euro to cover credit risk and a 
guarantee to cover possible fiscal costs arising from the provision of 265 million euro. 
The problems incurred when the European Commission has come to know about the 
intervention of FITD to solve the difficulties of Tercas. The Directorate-General for 
Competition (DG-COMP) started to deal with the Italian Ministry of Economic and Finance 
because the intervention of guarantee funds for depositors is considered state aid when their 
utilization is under the state control and even if the funds are privates. The Italian Authorities 
tried to explain the private nature of the funds and it started a long discussion with the 
European Commission in order to fix the problem about the utilization of the funds. The 27th 
February of 2015 the DG-COMP communicated the beginning of a formal investigation for 
Banca Tercas case. At the end of the investigation in December of the same year the 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG-COMP) declared the intervention of FITD as state 
aid and so against the current laws for the resolution of bank crises in EU. The incompatibility 
with the new rules was mainly because the new mechanism set a burden sharing for the 
shareholders and for subordinated debt holders. To conclude, Tercas was forced to giving 
back the sums received from the FITD with the respective interest for the period, but the 
payment was covered by the Schema Volonario an autonomous fund inside the FITD that it is 
not considered as state aid for the European authorities because it is not mandatory for the 
banks.  
With the review of this case it was possible to consider how the discipline introduced by the 
legislator is not still integrated with the national laws and this create difficulties in the choice 
of the best approach to assist the bank which need aid. The main difference from Tercas and 
the banks analyzed in the thesis is essentially a time question, because Tercas was aided by 
the FITD but before the application of BRRD which changed the rules and the playfield to 
save banks.  
In this first chapter we had a brief introduction about the condition of the Italian banking 
system during the crisis and the new rules adopted, so this define the actual context on which 
the Italian banks are operating. As we already said in this thesis, we concentrate on the most 
recent Italian bank bailout. This latter term has not legal definition, so we can consider it as 
rescuing or providing aid to a firm to prevent the firm from imminent bankruptcy or 
dissolution (Faccio et al., 2006). For our work, we define as time threshold to consider the 
institutions to study the introduction of the BRRD. The study is conducted in order to have a 
clear picture of the institutions involved on the rescue by the state, through the report of the 
main facts and the comprehension of the financial weaknesses which led to bailout. Moreover, 
this thesis tries to understand if the banks subject of bail out improved their performance or, 
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more easily, how they were impacted by the intervention of the state. Analyzing these aspects 
is relevant because the bailouts happened in a rule context different from the past, with more 
tighten rules about the state aid. So, studying these rescues gives us useful insights for the 
future where it is expected an enforcement of the EU mechanisms for what concern the rescue 
of banks. In the next chapters, we define a clear picture of the framework we are analyzing in 
order to better determine the research to conduct for understanding the implications on the 
banks after a rescue intervention. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and development of research question 
In the current chapter, it is reviewed the academic literature about the bank bailout and to be 
specific in the following pages are considered the different ways to save a bank by the state. 
Trough the theoretical analyses it is possible to understand the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the different instruments used by governments to bailout banks. The theory gives us the 
possibility to consider if the instruments used in Italy are useful to solve the bank cases and to 
develop and better understand the research reason of the thesis. The first part of the chapter 
goes through a deeper understanding of what reported in chapter 1 and so the relationships 
between the national and European laws, in order to have somehow clear the setting upon 
which the Italian bank cases are placed. The second one, as explained, is about the relevant 
literature. 
 
2.1: Resolution mechanisms 
In this section, it is reported the decisional path used in case of bank crisis. This path is 
particularly complex because there are many actors who participate in order to set a plan for 
the overcoming of bank difficulties: national authorities, European Central Bank, European 
Commission and in certain cases also other figures (de Aldisio, 2015). In this paragraph we 
do not want to discuss deeply about the measures adopted by legislator in to solve banks 
problems. The scope is to give essential knowledge about the process adopted to better 
understand the Italian bank bailout explained in the next chapter.  
In the first chapter we mentioned the BRRD and this is a law which give some instruments to 
overcome bank crisis spontaneously, to act immediately and to solve it in an ordered way. The 
objectives of this law are three, identifiable as public interest: the minimization of the impact 
of bank rescue on taxpayers, depositors, real economy, financial system and keeping the 
stability of the system (Stanghellini, 2016). The public interest is pivotal for BRRD because if 
it is present there are diverse ways to save a bank. Indeed, if we are in presence of public 
interest is given high power to authorities through instruments for the resolution: bail in or 
bridge banks. When the public interest is not touched the crisis should not be managed with 
resolution instruments but with the normal procedures, in the case of Italy with liquidazione 
coatta amministrativa (LCA). So, the fact is to understand that it is fundamental to value 
when the public interest is in peril, and this means a high grade of discretion. The problem is 
not present for big banks because in case of failure they could affect all the system and so 
they are not subjected to national law but rather to resolution introduced by BRRD. The 
problem arises with medium-small banks, indeed if resolution is put in practice when are 
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present banks which produce losses it could create a social cost while proceeding with the 
closure of bank through national instruments is costly for the clients of the bank. The bank in 
crisis is subjected to resolution or national law (LCA) if there are some assumptions that are 
common for both paths. These assumptions are two: the bank is in financial trouble and, the 
second, that there are not alternative measures to overcome the situation. About the first 
assumption, the bank for the law is in financial trouble when there is an insufficient 
capitalization, a financial tension, and a management crisis. These conditions are relevant not 
only when they appear but even if there is the real possibility that these appear in the next 
future. The decision about the state of the bank is demanded at the supervisory authorities 
with competence in the specific bank, European Central Bank or Bank of Italy, and at the 
resolution authorities of the bank, Single Resolution Board or, again, Bank of Italy when it 
acts with functions of resolution authority. When the bank management believes that there are 
financial troubles that can justify the intervention of authorities it should give notice as soon 
as possible of the situation to the competent authority. However, the omission of this 
communication it is relevant only on the managers’ responsibility because the bank cannot 
start a crisis procedure in its own, this power is given only to the specific organisms citated 
before. For what concern the presence of alternative measures to go over the troubles, these 
measures should be solutions based on market (e.g. increase of capital or sale of assets), 
interventions from institutional protection schemes arising from voluntary bank system 
contributions and, at the end, supervisory actions (LCA or other instruments). To put in 
actions the solutions here described, these should be exercised in adequate time in relation of 
the specific case to avoid damage to bank clients, to financial system stability and to market 
trust. When both of conditions above described are present it starts the mechanism to fix the 
problems with the intervention of specific resolution authority (SRB or Bank of Italy). This 
decide if proceed with national procedures (in Italy LCA) or resolution. However, before to 
implement this decision there is the valuation to overcome the troubles with a write down. 
Essentially with this operation a bank which is in a situation of crisis can cancel out all the 
shares issued and can convert the subordinated bonds on shares until to reach the required 
Tier 1 capital. In this case the authority should proceed without putting the bank in resolution 
but if the write down it is not enough to restore the capital, or it is not possible it enters the 
public interest concept. If it is present, we have a resolution while if it is missing it is open the 
LCA procedures. Until here it was reported how the authority decide to intervene and in 
which cases it is demanded the intervention of national or European schemes. Before to 
analyze the process step by step and giving a summary of all the different methods for the 
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management of bank crisis, it is necessary to give a view of the instruments introduced by 
BRRD and the Italian law.  
The Directive 2014/59, Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), it is an essential 
component for the formation of a European bank union. The harmonization between national 
systems for the management of crises it is essential for giving the same instruments to 
countries which are included in the Single Resolution Mechanisms (SRM). Moreover, the 
Directive gives a certain sense of coordination between the authorities of members countries 
and non-members countries. Following the description of de Aldisio (2015) the BRRD 
introduces common instruments to prevent and solve the financial institutions crisis. The 
authorities can adopt three kinds of measures. The first is the Recovery and Resolution Plans, 
it is established to guarantee plans to create a specific path in case of difficulty or in case of a 
real crisis. The authorities here can modify the structure of bank groups and businesses to 
solve bank problems. The second measures are preventive measures, these consent to solve 
problems before that these compromised the permanence of the intermediary in the market. 
The power gave by this instrument consent to ask at the management to implement corrective 
measures and when it is necessary it permits to remove the management nominating 
temporary administrators. The third measure introduced is established to set instruments for 
the resolution. These measures consider the power to transfer the assets and liabilities to 
another bank or a bridge bank; to form bad banks where transfer bad debt; and as last the bail-
in, a procedure to convert the debt instruments in shares or a reduction of liabilities value, 
imposing losses to shareholders and debtholders.  
In this section, it is not given a view of all the three instruments, but we focus our attention on 
the last measures describe so, those introduced for the resolution of institutions. The reason is 
that for understanding the thesis the comprehension of how these instruments work is 
essential. The first measure analyzed is sale of business, this includes the sale of asset and 
liability to an acquirer and can be considered the whole or part of asset and liabilities. The 
essential point is that the sale disposed from authorities does not require the consensus of 
shareholders. If there is any gain from the disposal this should be given to the bank under 
resolution process. The assets not transferred, usually assets not more performing, are cleared 
following the national laws in a certain period. The sale should be at market conditions 
without conflict of interest, any discrimination between possible acquirer and without giving a 
competitive advantage. Moreover, it is searched the maximization of the sale price. In Italy, 
the sale to a third acquirer of the business was traditionally applied in bank crisis, in order to 
ensure the continuity of the business of financial institutions under LCA.  
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The second measure is what is called bridge bank. The assets and liabilities of the bank under 
resolution can be transferred, partly or completely, to a temporary bank built from authorities 
for a further cession to other acquirers. This gives the possibility to maintain the essential 
functions of the bank until the sale. What is not transferred to the bridge bank stays on the 
bank under resolution and should be cleared in a brief period. The gain from the dispatch is of 
the bank in crisis but for the transfer of asset and liabilities it is not required any permission to 
shareholders, moreover to them it is not recognized any rights on the bridge bank. The bridge 
bank should be owned by public authorities, included resolution authorities or resolution fund. 
At the resolution authorities is demanded also to nominate the organisms of the bridge bank 
and to approve the strategy and the risk profile. The duration of a bridge bank is limited to 
two years and after this period it may be renovated year by year. After the sale of asset and 
liabilities in the market, the bridge bank is cleared. The gain from this last process is given to 
shareholders of bridge banks, public authorities, the funds or even the creditors subjected to 
bail-in. The bridge bank is an instrument particularly relevant when it is not possible to 
individuate immediately an acquirer. The instruments are particularly appropriated when it is 
possible to separate the good asset from bad asset, the first will transferred in the bridge banks 
while the others remain in the bank under resolution. 
Another instrument is the bad bank which is an asset separation tool and it is relevant in case 
of separation of damaged assets or when it is difficult to value good activities. This tool gives 
the possibility to release the financial statement from non-performing activities and it creates 
and advantage for the bank. For this reason, the Directive intend to utilize this tool together 
with other resolution instruments. The bad bank capital is completely or partially owned by 
the resolution fund or other resolution authorities and as the bridge banks the authority 
approve the management and the strategy as the risk profile. As the bridge bank, the gain goes 
to bank in resolution. Bad banks can be used when it is necessary to ensuring the right 
functioning of the institution or even to maximize the sale value. The mandatory condition for 
the use of this tool is that it should be used together with other resolution instruments, bail-in 
and bridge banks. 
The last mechanism to analyze is the bail-in. This tool consists in the reduction of shares 
value and of some debt and the conversion in shares of debt. This is the most important 
novelty introduced by the Directive. The reason behind this instrument is that the imposition 
of losses to shareholders and debt holders give the possibility to not touch the going concern 
and so not disrupt the relationships with customers and other market players. So, the fact is to 
anticipate the loss that shareholders and debt holders would suffer in case of bank trouble 
without waiting too much and avoiding worst market consequences. Moreover, another reason 
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is that the instrument reduces the contributions of taxpayers and limit the moral hazard. The 
conversion in shares of other instruments is imposed by the authorities. For this the 
application of the bail in is subject to some conditions: the public interest, the principle of no 
creditor worse off (creditors have not to lose more than they would lose with other 
instruments), the individuation of creditors classes attributable of bail in and some 
restorations for the creditors hit. The bail in excludes some instruments from its application, 
these instruments are for example the protected deposits, the covered bonds and others with 
specific collateral, interbank sums with a life of less than 7 days. More precisely there is a 
precise hierarchy for absorbing the losses: the first are stock and other capital instruments; 
than subordinated debt, bonds and other admissible liabilities; the deposits higher of 100.000 
euro of individuals and small-medium enterprises and as last the single resolution fund to 
protect account holders of more than 100.000 euro.  
After the explanation of the instruments introduced by the BRRD, it is time now to explain 
the decisional process for managing the bank crisis. The authority in charge of supervisory 
(ECB or Bank of Italy) or the authority for resolution (SRB or, again, Bank of Italy) 
determine if the bank under its control is in trouble. The resolution authority than determine 
that there are not alternative measures (market, protection systems or other supervisory 
actions) that give the possibility to overcome the situation in reasonable times. When both of 
conditions are present than the resolution authority apply the write down, as previously 
explained, otherwise the authority, if it is not possible or insufficient a write down, open the 
resolution. However, the resolution is open only when the public interest is mined and in the 
other cases, in Italy, is applied the liquidazione coatta amministrativa. When the authority 
chooses the resolution, it adopts the program more adequate to pursue the public interest. The 
resolution does not affect the possibility to put in LCA the bank when the institution is not 
any longer dangerous for the public interest after the application of resolution. So, the 
resolution can be considered more as a rescue of the system rather than a rescue of the bank. 
The involvement of European rules with national rules can make a substantial improvement of 
home country laws (Schoenmaker and Siegmann, 2014). 
In this section, it was reported the relevant laws that were introduced in recent years. These 
laws are an answer to the frequent bank bailouts during the crises. The new rules hit 
particularly the Italians banks because different banks entered in trouble after the introduction 
of the BRRD. So, the rule context on which the banks were saved it was different from other 
interventions of the Italian government. The Italian banks that were taken under consideration 
in this thesis were the banks bailed out after BRRD because this directive introduced a new 
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rule set. So, it is relevant to study these institutions because this novelty created cases with a 
different law context from the past.  
 
2.2: Literature about bailout effectiveness and efficiency 
In the next subsections are reviewed the studies about the impact of government instruments 
in dealing with bank crises. For a reason of an easier understandability the literature was 
divided following the instruments usually used as considered by Hryckiewicz (2014) and so 
by: government guarantees, liquidity provision, capital injection and TARP. These are the 
main instruments put in practice by countries, also by the Italian government, with the 
exclusion of TARP that, as we will see later, is a specific US instrument. Surely in the 
following paragraphs are not only proposed studies which refer to a specific instrument but 
also studies that try to understand the impact of bank bailout where a plurality of instruments 
are used. The academic literature here under attention is focused on the post intervention, 
especially to look at the efficiency of the rescue methods. What is here considered is the effect 
after the government intervention on the entities bailed out by the national authorities. This is 
particularly relevant because in this work we try to identify if the banks involved in the 
bailout were impacted by the state intervention. We seek to retrieve, if there are any, the 
effects of the bank bailout on the single institution. So, it is for this that we focused on the 
literature which studies the ex-post effects of the state aid on banks. Moreover, as we said the 
Italian government put in practice specific interventions that can be compared to the 
instruments here described, and for this from this literature we can understand how these 
instruments work and their characteristics but, what is more important, the possible 
implication on the rescued financial institutions.  
 
2.2.1: Government guarantees 
Before going deep in the analysis about government guarantees is necessary to understand 
what we consider when we refer to this tool. The guarantee schemes are different from 
country to country but there are some common characteristics: the eligible instruments (newly 
issued senior unsecured debt), the eligible institutions (primarily domestic banks), a limit on 
the amount of issuance for each bank, fees for the access, and a specific time period for 
availability (Grande, 2012).  
In July 2001 there was an announcement of the removal of explicit government guarantees for 
German Landesbanken and the effect on bank risk taking was studied by Fischer et al. (2014). 
The purpose of their work was essentially to analyze if the removal of guarantee increases 
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incentives for banks to take risks (franchise value effect) or if without a guarantee the 
creditors increased their control on the bank, decreasing the bank’s risk taking (market 
discipline effect). The removal of guarantees should increase risk taking because there is a 
loss in the future profits, the so-called franchise value. To exploit this natural experiment, it 
was used a differences-in-differences approach trying to answer to two questions: do 
Landesbanken provide credit to riskier borrowers after July 2001? Do Landesbanken adjust 
the interest rates to their borrowers accordingly? These to find evidence about the risk taking 
of German banks. The sample used consisted of 1578 syndicated loans issued between 1997 
and 2008. The results obtained show that the announcement of the retirement of guarantees 
creates a deterioration of the credit rating, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. 
After the removal of guarantees Landesbanken lend to riskier borrower but do not adjust 
interest rates and the effect is higher the highest the expected rating downgrade and so the 
highest loss in franchise value. This is a point in favor of guarantees because their elimination 
creates riskier institutions. 
Differently Gropp, Hakene and Schnabel (2010) investigated the effect of competitive effects 
of government bail-out policies. They considered both explicit and implicit guarantees, the 
latter are expectation to be saved even there is not any explicit commitment. The main 
hypothesis is that MSI (market share of insured competitor banks) increases banks risk taking. 
The dataset used includes more than 5000 banks from 30 countries. The results showed that 
government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks reducing their 
margins. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks’ 
risk-taking. Moreover, there is evidence that the public disinvestment and the discontinuation 
of explicit guarantees may be insufficient to eliminate effect of guarantees because markets 
expect banks to be bailed out in case of difficulties. In accordance with the findings the 
authors highlight the importance of reducing bailout expectations and to impose a capital 
surcharge (in addition to regular capital requirements) on the largest bank institutions to level 
the playfield between large banks and competing small banks. 
The guarantees gave by the government to banks can generate a risk return trade off in banks 
asset returns (Mäkinen et al., 2019). On the one hand the guarantees are beneficial given that 
guaranteed claims generate higher payoffs when guarantee is honored. On the other hand, if 
guarantees are less likely to be honored from the government when the economy worsens 
providing poor insurance. So, government guarantees can have a direct positive effect on bank 
risk premiums. To find this the researchers used CDS contracts to examine the impact of the 
guarantees on the cost of bank debt while for Equity returns are computed simply as the daily 
logdifference of the total return price index for about 88 banks. 
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During the financial crises of 2008 there were the intervention of governments to save banks 
and Grande (2012) reviewed the guarantee schemes adopted in Autumn 2008 assessing their 
effectiveness and their costs. The guarantee schemes adopted by the most advanced 
economies had two main objectives, to support bank funding so to avoid liquidity crises and 
to support bank lending to avoid credit crunch. The main short terms goals on bank bonds was 
to help banks to maintain access to medium-term funding at a reasonable cost. There is 
evidence that debt guarantees helped banks to resume medium-term funding. This evidence is 
also found by other studies (IMF, 2009; ECB, 2010; Schwartz, 2010). Another effect to 
consider is the effect of debt guarantees on the likelihood of banks’ insolvency and it can be 
found by looking at the credit risk premiums on bank bonds. The study focused on two types 
of indicators: the yield spreads on bank bonds and the credit default swap premium. The 
results show that debt guarantees lowered bank CDS premia reducing the bank insolvency. 
The last goal of public interventions was to support financial intermediation and so the credit 
to private sector, the evidences show that countries in which banks had a higher recourse to 
bond guarantees tended to have a stronger rebound of bank lending. 
 
2.2.2: Liquidity provision 
In the current section, it is analyzed the impact of liquidity provision on banks, considering 
what are the effects on banks of this solution in case of bank difficulties. This analysis is 
important to give a theoretical set to better understand and analyze the Italian bank bailout. 
It was studied the effect of provision of liquidity to banks during panic by Martin (2004) and 
specifically the main contribution was to understand if the liquidity during panics can prevent 
bank runs without moral hazard. He developed a model that shows how a liquidity provision 
policy can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard problems associated with deposit 
insurance. With deposit insurance banks are bailed out when their risky investment fails and 
that gives them incentive to take more risk than they would, creating moral hazard. Contrarily 
with liquidity provision there is not any incentive because it does not affect the bank’s return 
in an asymmetric way. Even Corsetti et al. (2006) analyzed the liquidity provision in relation 
with debtor moral hazard. They developed a model where crisis is caused by the interaction of 
bad fundamentals, self-fulfilling runs and policies by three agents: international investors, the 
local government and an international official lender. The model contributes to provide the 
main policy trade-offs in the design of liquidity provision by an international financial 
institution. Their research supports the fact that liquidity provision can work to prevent a 
destructive run although it shows that large and potentially unlimited liquidity provisions are 
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not necessary to reduce liquidity runs and in the model the success is limited to cases in which 
fundamentals are not too weak. There is also evidence about the incorrectness of the argument 
that liquidity support always induces moral hazard, thus, liquidity support may encourage 
good policy behavior rather than discourage it. 
When the number of bank failures increases the set of assets available for acquisition by 
surviving banks increase but the total liquidity falls. For Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) this 
results in cash in the market and when the bank failures are high there are too many banks to 
liquidate. So, inefficient users of assets who are liquidity endowed may end up owning the 
liquidated assets. Their research is focused on granting liquidity to surviving banks in the 
purchase of failed banks, which is equivalent to bailout policy from an ex-post standpoint. As 
the previous researches mentioned the authors created a theoretical framework as method to 
find the impact of liquidity provision.  
It is important to know not just the effect of government liquidity but also when there is the 
intervention of a lender of last resort (LOLR) providing liquidity to financial institutions. This 
is what Naqvi (2014) analyzed through a model that studies how the presence of a last resort 
lender affects the investment incentives of banks. Since banks hold only a fraction of their 
deposits as reserves, they are vulnerable to liquidity shocks which might hit the economy 
creating panic that affect the behavior of the depositors. The model developed identifies the 
optimal bail out policy by the LOLR and its effects on ex ante incentives. In the absence of a 
LOLR there is an underinvestment problem and a perfectly informed LOLR solve this 
underinvestment in smaller banks but conduct to a moral hazard of over investment in larger 
banks. This because larger banks are too big to fail, and this affects the ex-ante incentives of 
big banks. Another study focused on the presence of a lender of last resort in bailout banks is 
that reported by Cordella and Yeyati (2002). The central bank’s LOLR function creates the 
trade-off between being too severe, thus increasing the probability that a failure of a single 
bank damage the confidence of the market, and being too soft, creating incentives for 
excessive risks. The researchers showed that a central bank that announces and commits ex-
ante to bail out insolvent institutions, in times of adverse macroeconomic conditions, 
increases the value of the bank charter creating an incentives for prudent behavior that more 
than offsets the moral hazard component of such a policy. 
Another way to give liquidity to banks in trouble is through other banks. Leitner (2005) 
developed a model of financial networks in which linkages not only spread contagion but also 
induce private sector bailouts, where liquid banks bail out illiquid banks because of the 
contagion threat. So, the linkages that helps spread the contagion may be optimal because the 
threat of contagion can motivate agents to help one another. This is useful for us because in a 
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certain sense the funds as the FITD are set by the banks with the scope to intervene in case of 
banks difficulty. The main assumption of this study is the presence of a coordinating device as 
the SRM.  
During the financial crises in Japan there were various regulatory interventions and Shimzu 
and Cuong Ly (2016) examined the effectiveness of the intervention. In japan during 1990s 
and early 2000s were made four diverse kinds of interventions by the government. The public 
fund injection (PFI), reinforcing equity capital and providing liquidity to the financial system; 
the prompt corrective actions (PCA), which require early intervention when a bank 
capitalization is still positive but under-capitalized; the failure resolution scheme (FRS), to 
rescue banks purchasing or assuming the assets and liabilities of the failed banks with the aid 
of deposit insurance; the deposit insurance reforms (DIR), a deposit insurance policy. In 
summary the analysis provides supportive evidence for the liquidity provision by the 
government. The results showed a relevant support to liquidity and capital injection because 
seven individual PFI events have mitigated systemic risk while one largest PFI event failed. 
PFI mostly had a positive direct spillover effect but a negative external effect, however, the 
largest PFI event had a positive direct/external spillover. 
2.2.3: Capital injections 
In the present subsection, it is given a review of some researches about the effects of capital 
injection in banks to bail out them. Here capital injection is considered in a broad meaning 
and so all the set of instruments and mechanisms that help banks in difficulty to recover their 
capital.  
During the global financial crises in 2008 and 2009 were put in practice many measures to 
sustain banks and their functions in the markets. Brei et al. (2013) studied the impact of 
various rescue packages making special attention to recapitalizations for bank lending. To 
answer to their question, they analyzed a dataset of large international bank groups of the 14 
major advanced economies between 1995 and 2010. The method used by the researchers is a 
dynamic system called Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) useful to giving consistent 
and unbiased estimations of relationships between the macroeconomic variables, bank-
specific characteristics and bank lending. The results obtained by the authors show that bank 
capitalization plays an important role in supporting bank lending and the importance of 
capitalization differs in crisis and in normal times, with an increasing effectiveness of capital 
in a crisis. The benefits from capitalization are present only once the capitalization exceeds a 
critical threshold, undercapitalized banks seek to restore their regulatory capital ratio without 
generating additional lending. This suggests that recapitalizations may not translate into 
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greater credit supply until bank balance sheets are sufficiently strengthened. The effect of 
capital injection from the government in the event of bank crises is effective only when it 
overcome a specific amount of capital. In another study conducted by Brei and Gadanecz 
(2012) were analyzed the balance sheets of 87 large internationally active banks of G10 plus 
Austria, Australia and Spain. The main purpose of their research was to understand if bank 
rescues in the form of bank recapitalizations helped banks with risky lending activities to be 
safer. To find an answer they examined the syndicated loans where a group of banks extended 
credit to a single borrower. The banks were analyzed looking at the level of their assets, 
deposits, loans, syndicated loans and net income and at their balance sheet ratios: total loans 
relative to total assets, total deposits relative to total assets, Profitability (ROE) and impaired 
loans over total lending. The examination on large international banks reported that banks 
which received public rescue do not reduced the riskiness more than non-rescued banks.  
Other than riskiness of banks another dimension to take care is about the effect on liquidity of 
capital support. Berger et al. (2016) studied in deep this relationship by analyzing 114 
German banks which received capital support and the sample was composed of observation of 
the period 1999-2000. Just for the knowledge of the reader the research conducted was not 
only focused on capital injection but also on regulatory interventions but for the thesis this is 
not relevant and so it is not reported here the effect of regulations. To a better comprehension 
the authors divided liquidity creation into asset-side, liability-side and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation. Capital support reduces asset-side liquidity creation but increases liability-
side liquidity creation. These effects eliminate each other, and it is possible to not find overall 
effect of capital on the banks’ total liquidity creation. Furthermore, capital support reduces 
total loans, in line with the findings of reduction in asset liquidity creation and this effect is 
larger for corporate loans than for retail loans.  
Lin et al. (2014) analyzed the package effect of bailout policies, composed of direct equity 
injection, on the equity risk of a distressed bank. The research conducted by the authors use a 
down and out call (DOC) valuation model. The authors put emphasis on after tax earnings and 
interest margin, difference between the loan and the deposit rates, because is the principal 
element of bank cash flow. They examined how the bank’s interest margin is determined 
under government bailouts. With the identification of an optimal interest margin they study 
how a capital injection determine the bank’s equity risk. The results showed that capital 
injection tends to be successful in improving interest margin. Furthermore, they demonstrate 
also that banks prefer combined bailouts to a sole instrument from an equity return 
perspective while the government oppositely prefers one instruments rather than combined 
bailouts for reduce equity risk. We report here also the work of Veronesi and Zingales (2010), 
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they analyzed the equity infusion in ten banks at the end of 2008 by the US government. This 
for us is particularly relevant because they considered the costs and the benefit of state 
intervention on a small group of banks, as we are doing in the thesis. They conducted an event 
study analysis on the bonds, on common stock and preferred equity and then they calculated 
the net cost of the preferred equity infusion. The researchers also analyzed the plan from an ex 
ante point of view, and they studied the costs of alternative plans. From the research emerged 
that the plan was a success because it created value and the benefit created is the result of a 
reduced probability of bankruptcy.  
 
2.2.4: Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) 
In this section, it is reported the literature about the intervention of the US government to 
counteract the financial crises of 2008. This is particularly relevant for several reasons even if 
the instruments used were injection of preferred equity, essentially what considered in the 
paragraph before. Its relevance is due to the amount of literature written about it since the 
crises in 2008, and for the fact that TARP was the package used by the most important 
economy in the world to save its banks. For this was decided to separate this section from the 
others, to give a better explanation and an adequate importance. The most important 
instrument of TARP was the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) that injected capital into 
troubled banks and it committed 250 billion dollars of the 700 billion authorized for TARP, 
permitting financial institutions to sustain a normal flow of credit during the crisis (Office of 
Financial Stability, 2010). The US Treasury purchased $125 billion in preferred equity and 
debt from the nine largest banks, the preferred stocks pay a dividend rate of 5% per year and it 
will rise to 9% thereafter; the debt instruments pay a 7.7% interest rate that will increase to 
13.8%. The remaining $125 billion was made available to other banks that qualified for 
TARP funding (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010). 
Following Berger et al. (2016) a major objective of TARP was to reduce systemic risk and 
prevent a financial collapse which could have dragged down the real economy. In their work, 
differently from other researches, it is not examined the effects of bailouts on specific parts of 
the portfolios of bailed out banks but, more generally, if the TARP was effective in reducing 
systemic risk. It may seem obvious that injecting preferred capital into banks would reduce 
contribution to systemic risk however it is not so obvious this consequence. Indeed, there 
could be reasons that lead to say that TARP instrument may increase banks’ systemic risk. 
For example, the increase of risk may be caused: by capital priority channel (common equity 
difficult to raise due to subordination), by increase of banks moral hazard and by perception 
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of too big to fail that encourage banks to become larger. To solve this problem the research 
tries to answer to the question whether bailouts tend to reduce or increase systemic risks. The 
methodology applied was difference in difference and the sample was publicly listed 
commercial banks in the US over 2005-2012 period. The results suggest that TARP led to 
significant decrease of systemic risk consistent with a stabilization of the financial system. 
The analyses suggest that larger banks, safer banks and banks with better economic condition 
were the first drivers for a reduction of systemic risk. It is also showed the channels through 
which bailouts are effective and the primary channel is capital cushion, useful to reduce 
leverage risk. Bailout may affect systemic risk through the alteration of leverage risk, 
portfolio risk and systemic importance of bank. The last finding is that bailout may be most 
effective when systemic problems are at their worst. 
As seen until now many studies about bail out of financial institutions report the effects of the 
rescue programs, used by governments, on a specific element. Harris at al. (2013) differently 
tried to discover the effects of TARP on the overall operational efficiency of a bank which 
benefits of this program. The researchers analyzed a sample of 227 TARP funded banks 
obtained from a list of TARP recipients received from the US Treasury department and a 
matched portfolio of non-TARP banks. The considered period started six quarters before the 
beginning of TARP capital infusion and finished six quarters after the TARP capital infusion. 
The methodology applied to measure: the bank efficiency, the impact of TARP on efficiency, 
the change inefficiency and the abnormal change in efficiency was Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). From the study emerged that the operating efficiency of banks declined as a 
result of the crises, but the operating efficiency is worse for TARP banks compared to non-
TARP banks, and the researchers attributed these findings to related moral hazards. The 
operating efficiency weakened because the intervention reduces the incentives of managers to 
adopt best practices to improve asset quality. Moreover, the results reveal that when the 
likelihood of receiving capital injection is higher the change in bank efficiency is worse. 
An important aspect to consider in case of bail out it is not specifically the rescue itself but 
rather the bail out announcement by the authorities. Wang (2013) in his study analyzed how 
the announcement of bailouts affects investors’ bank run incentives and consequently the 
impact on banks. The study was based on a model variation of Diamond-Dybvig and 
investors choose if to withdraw their investments early or to wait until maturity. Investors and 
governments receive private noisy about the quality of bank assets and the probability of a 
bank bailout in case of overcoming of a certain threshold. Two effects were taken into 
consideration: the probability of bank runs reduction due to rescue and the signaling effect so 
to give information in the market after the announcement. The model highlights that the 
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signaling effect from government bailouts may increase the probability of bank runs since 
bailouts signal the government's information that the bank is in trouble.  
Li (2013) investigated the determinants of the TARP fuds distribution to banks and the 
stimulus effect on credit supply in the economy. This research finds that TARP investments 
increased bank loan supply by an annualized rate of 6.36% for bank with low tier 1 capital 
ratios. The TARP banks used the capital received for about one third to support new loans and 
kept the rest to strengthen the balance sheets. The study is conducted through a two-step 
treatment effects model by using the variables to proxy CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk). 
The TARP, following Berger and Roman (2015), gave competitive advantages to recipients 
and they increased market share and market power relative to non-TARP recipients. 
Moreover, these positive findings may be driven primarily by the safety channel (TARP 
banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the cost-disadvantage channel 
(TARP funds may be relatively expensive). The competitive advantages are primarily due to 
recipients that repaid early, suggesting that these banks significantly reduced the importance 
of the cost-disadvantage channel and increased the importance of the safety channel. The 
method used by the researcher was a difference in differences (DID) and they collect the 
TARP recipients in the Treasury’s Web site, and they obtained bank data from quarterly Call 
Reports for the period 2005:Q1-2012: Q4.  
Since here, studies were described which analyzed specific instruments but as said before 
there are also researches which do not separate the effect of specific instruments but rather 
analyzed the effect of a package of bail out tools. Indeed, Gerhardt and Vennet (2016) 
investigated financial condition of banks before and after state support, specifically they 
identified bank characteristics that predict bank distress and investigated if banks aided 
improved their performance following a bailout. The dataset was created by them and was 
composed by EU, Norwegian and Swiss banks in the years 2007-2013. The threshold for 
considering a bank was of 10 billion which leads to 114 aided and 212 non-aided banks. The 
indicators used were related to Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, 
Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. The findings of this study can be summarized as 
follows. The leverage ratio is a better predictor for bank distress and banks with a lower 
leverage ratio were more likely to be involved in a government-assisted bailout. Bank size is 
associated with bailout probability and loan loss provision/non-performing loans and net 
interest margin useful for distinguish between aided and non-aided. For what concern the 
effectiveness of rescue programs the study highlights that post-bailout performance is slowly 
at best and hat banks are quick at recognizing the loan loss provision. Moreover, the 
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researches recommend that governments should require rapid and decisive action from the 
rescued banks in terms of redesign business model and governance changes.  
Another study which do not refers specifically to a single policy mechanism but try to 
understand the effect total impact of rescue packages on banks is the research of Hryckiewicz 
(2014). In the study the researcher analyzed the total impact of government intervention in the 
bank sector, if the coverage and the structure of government intervention matter, which 
instrument contribute the most to the estimated effect and the optimal bailout package. The 
sample employed by the author consists of assisted banks from 23 countries on which they 
made a regression analysis. The results obtained show that government interventions are 
useful to limit negative consequences of financial crisis, but the regression shows that 
government interventions are associated with risk increase in post crisis period. Specifically, 
the results demonstrate that the risk may be a result: of reduced market discipline, of 
inefficient bank’s management and lack of restructuring process. Particularly, blanket 
guarantees, nationalization and AMC contribute to the risk effect the most while mechanisms 
involving market discipline appear to perform best from a risk-reduction perspective. Thus, 
the total effect of government intervention is dependent on the combination of various 
intervention measures. As last finding the study reports that negative effects from an 
individual intervention might be mitigated by an appropriate choice of instruments.  
 
The literature since here described gives us relevant knowledge about the bail out impact on 
banks, analyzing different instruments used by the governments to rescue troubled banks. 
From this analysis emerged that the effects of programs involved in the rescue of banks are 
more intricated than they could appear. Indeed, there is not a univocal evidence that shows the 
soundness of rescue plans. However, from the researches here reported is possible to obtain 
relevant information on the impact of bailout on financial institutions. The risk taking by the 
financial institution was one of the most analyzed measure on which it was observed the 
impact of rescue programs. Risk taking is relevant because it increases the probability of 
default of financial institutions compromising their business. From this prospective the studies 
above are not together in defining that the bank rescue gives a reduction in risk taking of 
saved institution. To be precise all the studies above, which relate to capital injection and 
liquidity provision instruments, agree about the reducing effect of these instruments on risk 
taking. While the opinion on guarantees instruments in theories above are in disaccord. 
Another aspect touched by the researchers above mentioned is the aspect of bank run, 
particularly relevant for banks under difficulty because can seriously damage them. However, 
liquidity programs can reduce the banks’ run and it is not necessary an injection of unlimited 
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liquidity, oppositely there is evidence of bank run in case of announcement of bail out due to 
signaling effect, but this is just considering the announcement and not the rescue plan itself. 
Another important aspect usually considered in the literature about bank bailout is the moral 
hazard. In the analysis of the theory it is showed that liquidity provision can create problems 
of moral hazard, but liquidity can limit underinvestment in small banks, increase value of 
bank charter creating prudent behavior that more than offsets moral hazard and be useful 
when liquid banks bail out illiquid banks. From previous explanations, it is possible to assert 
that moral hazard affects operating efficiency compromising the bank activity. The studies 
showed, report the effect on one of the most important sources of income for banks, interest 
margin. Precisely, guarantees instruments seems to increase the propension to lend to risky 
borrowers without increasing interest rates while capital instruments are successful in 
increasing interest margins. From a prospective of operating efficiency it is showed that 
guarantees increase mid-term funding and reduce bank insolvency. Capital instruments seem 
effective to avoid bankruptcy and are relevant for supporting bank lending, especially in 
difficult periods, but these instruments do not affect bank liquidity. 
As we already said, in this work we study the Italian bank bailout, focusing on events 
happened after the introduction of the BRRD and this is relevant because we studied 
interventions on a new context that will characterize the next future. The aspect on which we 
concentrate is the ex-post phase and this means the bailout impact on banks. However, before 
to have a look after the rescue we individuate the causes which led to bank troubles and 
subsequently to the state intervention. To find the causes is relevant because we can analyze if 
these were solved with the bailout. So, we can say that in this thesis firstly we individuate the 
reasons which created financial distress in the Italian banks under consideration as long to 
require the intervention of the state. Subsequently, we consider the impact of the bailout on 
the banks that were affected by the bailout, considering if the causes were solved and if there 
are any other relevant impacts. Further in this work we try to give an answer to what we are 
asking through the presentation of the bank cases and the subsequent analysis. 
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Chapter 3: Banks problem description and State intervention 
 
In the first part of this chapter the Italian banks which entered in crisis are examined. In 
particular, the relevant solutions adopted for the management of banks in trouble are 
highlighted and the critical points which conducted these banks to instability are explained. It 
is useful to report about these banks for understanding the methods applied by the state to 
rescue the banks, if there are reasons other than the financial distress for the bank crisis and 
the time of intervention to use as threshold in the analysis. The cases are analyzed bank by 
bank but where possible the institutions are grouped because many institutions were bail out 
in group and so they have many facts in common. The banks here defined are object of a 
specific analysis and in the second part of the chapter it is defined the methodology and the 
research design for studying deeply these banks. 
 
3.1: Monte dei Paschi di Siena-MPS 
We begin to report the facts about this financial institution following the description of 
Barbagallo (2017) starting from the acquisition of Antonveneta. MPS purchased this bank in 
November 2007 for a price of 9 billion euro, of which 6 for the goodwill, calculated through 
the dividend discount model. The acquisition establishes an increase of capital to respect the 
minimum level required and, between the other actions, JP Morgan underwrites an increase of 
capital for 1 billion using the sum received for the emission of convertible bonds (so called 
FRESH - Floating Rate Equity-linked Subordinated Hybrid). It is important to notice that the 
acquisition dates at a period before the financial crisis and so the economic context still 
favorable. The operation had as main scope the coverage of the Nord-East of Italy and this 
operation was not subject to an independent due diligence because the supervisory did not 
require it. Bank of Italy in the letter for the authorization asked to MPS to create some capital 
buffers and to strengthen the governance of Antonveneta because in the last inspection it 
resulted in bad conditions (a result of 4 out of 5). Another point highlighted by the 
supervisory was about the FRESH, asking whether the contracts were in line with the nature 
of core capital gave to the instrument. Just after the conclusion of the acquisition, in the 
second part of 2008, the crisis started and between the 2008 and 2011 Bank of Italy conduced 
10 inspections. The rating of the inspections was partially unfavorable (4 out of 6). The 
liquidity position was undermined by two repurchase agreements conducted with Deutsche 
Bank and Nomura for a total value of about 5 billion. These were components of two 
operations called “Santorini” and “Alexandria”. In the second half of 2010, it appears 
necessary to proceed with a capital increase and in July 2011 MPR strengthens the capital for 
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about 3 billion. In 2011 the sovereign debt crisis worsens the situation of MPS, especially for 
what concern the liquidity which is affected by the two repurchase agreement above 
mentioned. The supervisory after the inspection of September 2011 certified that the problems 
found before are not fixed and confirmed an inadequate management. Always in the second 
half of that year the Bank of Italy solved the liquidity problem through the lend of high liquid 
assets and asked a change of the management that it is then accomplished by MPS. In January 
2012, the inspective powers of the judicial authority discovered some contracts about the 
FRESH, never communicated to Supervisory, and from these raised problems for the 
calculation in the core capital. After other inspections and other sanctions to the managers in 
June 2012 Bank of Italy studied the relationships between MPS and Enigma Securities LLP 
about the Italian bonds and the valuation and accounting representation of structured 
securities. The inspectors decided to examine much more operations than the internal MPS 
auditing (432 against 12) and the results show large anomalies. The new management 
discovered the mandate agreement signed with Nomura and from this is possible to 
understand that the Italian BTP 2034 were never purchased by Nomura. The mandate 
agreement found proves the relationships between the operation Alexandria and the 
repurchase agreement stipulated with the Japanese financial institution. Hiding this contract 
gave the possibility to MPS to avoid showing the real structure of the operation and from the 
beginning it was an operation with a negative fair value. The supervisory for this reason never 
understood the real scope of the operation, separately from the different methods of 
accounting that could be used. In February 2013 MPS communicates to the market the errors 
in the Financial Statements for the operation Alexandria and Santorini and announces a 
restatement. The errors are an amount of, respectively, 308 and 429 million euro and they 
consist in the reporting at fair value, rather than at the cost of purchase, of the losses of the 
two operations. The accounting representation is not modified, the different components are 
calculated separately rather than as a structured instrument. Due to the complexity of the 
operation it is asked to MPS to give full information about the repurchase agreement. 
Moreover, it is demanded to show the effects in the financial statement of a representation of 
the operations as derivatives compared with the previous exercise. The operations are at the 
end closed: Santorini in December 2013 and Santorini in September 2015. 
It is important to reveal that MPS received state support during the sovereign debt crisis. 
Specifically, the European Bank Authority in the second part of 2011 promotes an exercise on 
capital, to test the impact on this of the valuation of government bonds at the market price. 
The EBA subsequently asked at the banks to maintain a core tier 1 capital more elevated and 
MPS following this request registers a capital shortfall of about 3,3 billion. MPS declares to 
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be not able to cover the capital deficit alone with market operations and asked the intervention 
of government support measures between 1,3 and 1,7 billion and the government issued new 
financial instruments (the so-called Monti Bond). The reimbursement of the instruments was 
anticipated in respect of the deadline and, together with other instruments previously issued 
by the state, generated benefits as interests of about 900 million. 
In 2014 is conducted the Comprehensive Assessment of the principal European banks because 
in the same year the Single Supervisory Mechanism would be introduced. MPS shows a 
capital deficit, in the worst scenario presented by the stress test, of 2.1 billion. This deficit is 
covered with an increase of capital of about 3 billion in June 2015 and part of this new 
increment is used to cover the Monti Bond. The ECB, that meanwhile assumed the 
supervisory on the institution, asked to respect a CET1 ratio of 10,2%. Another stress test is 
performed by the Single Supervisory Mechanism during the 2016 and MPS highlights a bad 
condition in case of an adverse scenario at the end of 2018 (-2,4% of CET1 of the risk 
weighted assets). The 23rd December of 2016 the government adopts an act (D.L. 237/2016 of 
Italian law) with the scope of guaranteeing bank liabilities of first emission and to participate 
at the banks’ capital under what prescribed by the BRRD and European Commission for what 
concern state aid. The same day MPS asks to participate at the liquidity provision for 15 
billion and the intervention for the capital is presented by the D.L. 237/2016 of Italian law. 
The ECB quantifies the amount necessary for the capital in 8,8 billion, of which 6,3 are 
necessary to restore the CET1 ratio at the threshold of 8,8% and other 2,5 for a total capital 
ratio of 11,5%. After the presentation of a restructuring plan by MPS to the authorities 
(Ministry of Economic and Finance, European Central Bank and Bank of Italy) the European 
Commission approves definitively the measure for the state support. The maximum import 
established by the public intervention is of 5,4 billion: 3,9 for the capital increase and 1,5 for 
investors subjected to burden sharing. At the beginning of August 2017, the banks used the 
funds obtained by the Ministry of Economic and Finance to issue 593.569.870 common 
shares and the state become shareholder with the 53%.  
 
3.2: Cassa di risparmio di Genova e Imperia (CARIGE) 
In the present subsection is reported information about the financial institution of Liguria 
region. The explanation of the facts is based on what reported on the intervention of Panetta 
(2019) to the Italian Parliament Commissions. Carige during the period comprised between 
2008 and 2011 enlarges its activity but further it is evident that these are not supported by an 
adequate planning. The crisis makes difficult the realization of some risky choices and these 
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problems are amplified by unruly behavior episodes which mine the reputation of the bank. 
The main shareholder, Fondazione Carige, does not put in practice an appropriate selection of 
top management components and moreover, in order to not dilute the quote, the measures for 
a capital reinforcement are more time insufficient and late. These actions are discovered 
thanks to the supervisory of Bank of Italy in 2013 and then through the inspections of the 
Judicial Authority. Another crucial aspect for Carige, as in other local banks, is the collapse of 
assets due surely to the economic crisis but also because of a low quality in the system for the 
concession of loans, many times under conflict of interest. As already said in the period 2008-
2012 the bank shifts its activity from families and small enterprises to big customers. The 
sectors, mainly real estate and maritime transport, of these big customers further entered in 
crisis crating difficulties for the financial institution. It is relevant also the impact of two 
insurance companies controlled by Carige (Carige Vita Nuova e CarigeAssicurazioni). 
Indeed, these companies presents problems of profitability, of internal controls and 
distribution channel. In the period 2010-2012 they report losses for about 240 million and the 
parent Carige recapitalized with 390 million from 2008 until the disposal in 2014. The effects 
of the expansive strategies and of loan policies are reflected on the quality of the loans, with 
an increase of risk and subsequently of non-performing loans. Many inspections are 
conducted and these evidence problems which required the intervention of the supervisory for 
trying to solve them. In 2012 is required an increase of capital of about 800 million, then 
realized in 2014; in 2013 all the organisms of the bank changed, and another capital injection 
is realized in 2015. With this last intervention the bank recovers its capitalization until to 
reach a level higher than required by BCE in 2015-2016. At the end of 2015, the CET1 is 
12,2% with a request of 11,5% while at the end of 2016 it is at 11,4% with a request of 
11,25%. A relevant aspect is the relationships between the shareholders and the top 
management, in just three years four different CEO and three presidents are changed. These 
tensions limit the important initiatives for the reorganization and then the supervisory requires 
the amministrazione straordinaria (special administration). At the end of 2017, another 
operation of recapitalization is realized for about 900 million. In the spring of the 2018 the 
capitalization is ready to be completed with the emission of subordinated bonds and with the 
reorganization of the group through the disposal of assets, but something goes wrong. The 
already cited governance problems do not give the possibility to complete these operations. In 
lights of this the BCE requires to Carige the presentation of a Capital Conservation Plan and 
the bank completed it the 22nd June of 2018. The crisis of the governance touches the limit in 
the second half of 2018 and in the August of the same year Mooody’s downgrades the bank 
giving as main motivation the tensions in the governance which limit the reorganization and 
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create instability for the bank. In the period between April and August 2018 the ECB 
conducted an inspection on credit risk and are emerged losses for 257 million. In December 
2018 the ECB authorizes Carige to realize a new increase of capital of 400 million euro, this 
is guaranteed by the subordinated loan of 320 million issued the 30th of November by the 
FITD (see chapter 1), convertible in shares of the same amount in case of not full subscription 
of capital by the market. However, the main shareholder (MalacalzaInvestimenti) does not 
give the consensus to complete the operation financed by the bank system and the bank 
entered in amministrazionestraordinariathe 2nd January 2019. 
The Italian Government issues an act (D.L. 1/2019) which contains the measures for the 
liquidity and capital of Carige bank to guarantee the financial stability and protect the savings. 
With this act the State guarantees the emission of new bonds and the financing by Bank of 
Italy in order to deal with possible liquidity problems (the so-called emergency liquidity 
assistance). Moreover, the act gives the authorization to the Ministry of Economic and 
Finance to acquire shares in case of a recapitalization. Finally, the act establishes a fund of 1,3 
billion to cover potential losses arising from these measures. The act presents: the conditions 
to have the guarantees, the remuneration that Carige should give back to Italian Government, 
the characteristics of the liabilities guaranteed and the commitments in order to benefit of the 
guarantees. Banca Carige for asking the guarantee should present the demand to the Bank of 
Italy and the Ministry of Economic and Finance. The request of Carige should be than 
presented to the European Commission who confirm the issuance of guarantee if it is in line 
with the state aid discipline. The European Commission after these steps gives a positive 
answer the 18th January 2019. In two months from the concession of guarantees the bank 
should present a restructuring plan to confirm the profitability and the ability to collect capital 
in the long period. For what concern the decision to grant liquidity of emergency the decision 
is on the hands of Bank of Italy, based on EU schemes. The maximum amount for the 
guarantees is based on ability to restore the financing of the medium long period and it cannot 
exceed the limit of 3 billion. The bank when benefits of the guarantee cannot distribute 
dividends or repay other capital instruments and cannot acquire shares of other companies. 
The second part of the act is about the recapitalization of Carige from the Italian State. This 
instrument is used only when the recapitalization of Carige is not possible to realize and the 
intervention should be required by the financial institution. The act is in line with the 
requirements of the BRRD because it is used to satisfy a capital need based on scenario of 
stress not to cover losses already proved or predictable as those found by supervisory 
inspection. Furthermore, the bank should be solvent and so able to respect the law 
requirements. The verification of these condition is under the control of the European 
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Commission together with the verification of the respect of the competition requirements. 
Following the act if the state enters in the equity there is the conversion of subordinated bonds 
in shares applying the burden sharing. From the moment that the only subordinated bond is in 
the hands of the voluntary scheme of the FITD the act does not require any restoration for 
non-professional investors. The entrance of the State in Carige should be at a price determined 
by an independent expert. Carige the 2ndJanuary of 2020 communicates that an operation of 
recapitalization of 700 million was completed, it was subscribed a subordinated bond for 200 
million, it was disposed an NPL portfolio of 2,8 billion. The recapitalization was subscribed 
by the FITD for 300 million, by the Schema Volontario for 313,2 million, 63 million by 
Cassa Centrale Banca and the remaining by those one who were shareholders before the start 
of the offer (Carige, 2019). 
 
3.3: Four banks: Ferrara, Marche, Etruria, Chieti 
These banks are grouped together because the authorities, as it is further explained, treated 
them in an analogous way in order to solve their troubles. For this reason, the description and 
the comprehension of what happened is easier if these institutions are explained in the same 
section. These banks were the first case of application of the BRRD in Italy because the 
intervention was put in action at end of 2015 (Locatelli et al., 2018). As we have seen in the 
previous sections, here it is showed the conditions which led the institutions in financial 
trouble and the intervention by the State.  
The first institution that it is considered is Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara also called Carife. 
At the beginning of 2000 Carife follows a growth strategy through a territorial expansion with 
the acquisition of small banks in Emilia Romagna and Veneto region and through the 
presence in Rome, Milan and Naples. At the end, the group was composed of seven banks and 
one leasing company. Due to this ambitious business development the supervisory asks at 
Carife to create an adequate organizational structure and an appropriate capitalization. So, 
between the 2008 and the 2009 Carife and its subsidiaries increased their capital for an 
amount of 110 million. After the inspection of 2009 it is evident that the bank is exposed to 
high risks with the concrete possibility of further capital troubles. A determinant role is in 
head of the foundation which limits the capital increase to protect its stake, 67%, and it 
presents a generous dividend policy limiting the self-financing. The supervisory starts to 
observe with more attention the situation and asks multiple times a reorganizational plan and 
a capital increase to guarantee a CET1 of 8%. Finally, in September 2011, the bank sells some 
assets and increases the capital until to reach an 8,6% of CET1 and a 12,5% of Total capital 
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ratio and the foundation sees a decrease of its stake from the 67% to 55%. However, the 
situation does not improve because in February 2013 the damaged loans are 34%, the 
liquidity is low and the 15% of the capital subscribed in 2011 is in the hands of banks of 
which Carife simultaneously bought shares and bonds. Moreover, the capital is 280 million 
(and not 599 million as reported by the bank) and a CET1 of 6,6% against 8% demanded. In 
May 2013 the bank enters in amministrazione straordinaria (special administration). 
We start now to analyze Banca delle Marche. In the mid-2000’s the bank is strongly located 
with more than 80% of the branches located in Marche region and it is composed of a small 
bank (Cassa di Risparmio di Loreto) and a leasing company (Medioleasing). The ownership 
of the bank is shared between three bank foundations, but they disagree the future prospective 
of the institution. The management strategy is based on an increase of assets but without a 
consistent collection from clients, this creates a decrease of capital together with liquidity 
problems. The CET1 is a little above the minimum required (8,3% against 8%) while the non-
performing loans are in line with Italian system. In September 2007 there is an injection of 
capital of 150 million subscribed in the same measure by the three foundations and the CET1 
rises to 10,2%. The bank hires an advisor to find an acquirer for the group and it finds four 
proposals from four big banks than reduced at two. However, the owners disagree between 
the choice to find a partner and to continue with their independence. After many inspections 
in January 2011, it is possible to know a critical situation of the leasing company with high 
risk positions of about 30% and non-performing loan of about 15,4% and a dividend policy 
inured to satisfy the requests of the owners. Nevertheless, the non-performing loans and the 
capital of the group do not show a critical situation. In January 2012 the Bank of Italy through 
a letter invites Banca delle Marche to take some interventions in order to adjust liquidity and 
loan lending. Just after the letter the bank increases the capital and the CET1 is at 6,8% while 
the total capital ratio at 10,1%, the foundations own 56% of capital and the bank Intesa San 
Paolo decreases its stake at 5,8%. Through the inspection of Tercas not clear operations of the 
Banca delle Marche general director are discovered and in August 2012 a new general 
director is nominated. After the provisioning campaign the situation results worse than what 
reported by the institute, the non-performing loans result to be 22% of assets against a bank 
system percentage of 13,5. This results in a capital that is deteriorating and the 25th July of 
2013 the supervisory presents at the bank the necessity to increase the capital of at least 300 
million. The research of investors is failed and the subordinated bonds for professional 
investors issued for 100 million are subscribed for only 25 million by two foundations. The 
30th June of 2013 the losses reaches 230 million and consequently the total capital ratio is at 
6,7% while the tier1 is at 4,3% with a necessity of capital of about 430 million. With this 
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situation the 15th October of 2013 the bank enters in amministrazione straordinaria (special 
administration). 
Now it is the turn of Casa di Risparmio di Chieti (Carichieti). The small group is composed 
by a bank in Milan (Flashbank) and two other small companies. The ownership is in the hands 
of the Foundation of Chieti and the remaining 20% is owned by Intesa. Between the 2003 and 
the 2008 the bank increases its activity in other territories and at the end of this period its 
activity is based only for a 60% in its traditional territory. This strategy creates problems of 
liquidity and credit risk, indeed in July 2009 the non-performing loans are 12,5% against an 
average of the system of 9,1% but the situation is not so dangerous because the capital is 
much higher than the minimum required. An inspection conduced in April 2010 on the 
subsidiary Flashbank finds that the subsidiary has some problems on governance and internal 
controls. Indeed, Flashbank pursues a strategy of lending of high amount to big customers 
rather than giving loans of small amount to families and small-medium enterprises, as 
expected by the original mission. The total non-performing loans are 26,2%. The supervisory 
asks in September 2010 the incorporation of Flasbank and to remove the general director of 
Carichieti. This happened in January 2011 while the incorporation of the subsidiary six 
months later. After the inspection of June2012 the bank presents non-performing loans at 
21,2% and the capital is reduced and is above the minimum for 36 million. The actions 
conducted by the bank confirms that it is not able to solve the situation alone. In February 
2014 a new inspection highlights the bank crisis, the profitability is compromised, and the 
capital does not permit to cover the new requirements together with the buffer. Moreover, the 
non-performing loans reaches the 32% of total assets and many managerial irregularities were 
found. The 5th September of 2014 Carichieti enters in amministrazione straordinaria (special 
administration). 
Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio (BPEL) is the biggest institution of the four here 
considered. It is a group composed by the holding company, a private bank, other companies 
of financial services and two small insurance companies. After an inspection of July 2007, the 
bank shows some difficulties in term of capital, liquidity and governance. During the 2008 
and 2009 the bank enlarges its business and after the requests of the supervisory in July 2008 
the bank increases its capital of 160 million. From the second part of 2008 the liquidity 
position starts to be low and Bank of Italy requires an intervention to increase liquidity. In 
January 2010 after a new inspection the non-performing loans are the 13,9% against a system 
average of 9,1%. The supervisory after many interventions does not see any improvement and 
so in March 2011 it is imposed to the institution the stop of the asset growth, the limit of 
internal and external growth and the disposal of companies’ ownership. The situation is 
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solved only after the concession of a guarantee from the state on new debt issued in December 
2011. The bank tries to overcome its problems through a capital increase with convertible 
bonds of 100 million. At the end of 2011 the non-performing loans reach the 20,6% of total 
assets and in November 2012 there is the conversion in shares of convertible bonds of 100 
million with a plan of another capital increase for other 100 million. At the end of 2012, as 
already said, it is conducted an inspection in order to value the funds to cover the non-
performing loans. BPEL results in underestimation of losses of 232 million and at the end of 
2012 the financial statement closes with a loss of 203 million. In 2013 the bank realizes the 
full capital increase of 100 million and issuing two other subordinated bonds for 110 million. 
Although the bank is affected mainly by governance problems there is not any capital 
shortfall. The 5th December of 2013 it is asked to BPEL to find a partner able to bring capital 
and knowledge. The process to find a partner is conducted by two advisors and only two bank 
groups show their interest but subsequently it remains only one group, Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza. The offer proposed by the latter, a takeover bid by cash and transformation in Etruria 
SpA, is refused by BPEL and the 1st August of 2014 BPEL declares to have concluded the 
deal with the partner. During the partner research the non-performing loans reaches the 38% 
of assets and the dependence from the ECB financing reaches 1,6 billion. In August 2014 
BPEL tries to find a new partner through another advisor but there is not any relevant offer. 
After this news the Bank of Italy conduces a new inspection and the result is that the non-
performing loans are 42,4% of total assets, the losses are about 500 million with a total capital 
ratio of 1,3%. The bank enters in amministrazione straordinaria (special administration) the 
10th February of 2015. 
As we saw all the four banks enter in special administration. Carife and Banca delle Marche 
enter in the middle of 2013 with similar conditions, a total capital ratio of about two points 
less than the minimum required. Carichieti a year later with a capital about the minimum 
requirement and BPEL six month later with a capital extremely low. The commissioners 
(temporary management in charge of valuate the situation and irregularities with the objective 
to promote solutions) find other losses on loans which decrease further the capital. With the 
exclusion of Carichieti, for the other three banks are registered high liquidity problems. 
During this period, it is not found any acquirer for the banks and until the end of 2015 the 
contacts with European Commission do not give a positive answer for what concern the 
intervention of the FITD. The Italian authorities try to find a solution before the end of the 
2015 because the liquidity situation, of three of the four banks, is very bad but mostly because 
the 1st January of 2016 the bail-in becomes mandatory with the increase of costs for all the 
related parties. With the intervention of the FITD the costs for the debtholders would be 
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minimized but many times the European Commission refuse the intervention of the fund 
considered as state aid. In November 2015, the new Italian rules about the BRRD are ready 
and the Bank of Italy starts the resolution of the banks. It is necessary to respect some 
conditions for the intervention of the resolution and the four banks are judge by the Bank of 
Italy in financial trouble, of public interest and without alternative solutions. The resolution 
strategy is based on reduction of the shares and of subordinated bonds to cover some losses. 
The banks are disposed to four bridge banks, the non-performing loans are transferred to a 
vehicle (REV Gestione Crediti S.p.A) and the national resolution fund intervenes for 
financing the resolution. It is confirmed that the principle of no creditor worse off is 
respected. The last step is about the sale of the bridge banks and it is given official invitation 
to present interest in January 2016. The 10th May of 2017 UBI banca acquires from the 
national resolution fund the bridge banks with exclusion of Nuova carafe (the bridge bank of 
the previous Carife). BPER acquires the 30th June of 2017 Nuova Carife. The European 
Commission approves both operations. The NRF grants guarantees and the subscription for 
capital increase for 713 million to respect financial requests.  
 
3.4: Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BPV) and Veneto Banca (VB) 
In this section is reported the case of the two banks of Veneto region. Also in this case the 
banks are not reported alone because they are acquired by the same group but above all 
because many problems are common between the two institutes: loans granted without 
appropriate methods, unclear methods for setting the shares price and operazioni baciate not 
deducted from the capital (Barbagallo, 2017).  
Starting with Veneto Banca we can say that the bank in 2007 launched a takeover bid over the 
75% of the ordinary shares of Banca Popolare di Intra. This aggregation project was in line 
with the enlargement purpose of the group and with the aim to reinforce strategic 
geographical areas. The acquisition involved an outlay of 633.277.215 euro and together with 
Intra VB incorporated its subsidiaries: Banca Popolare di Monza e Brianza and Intra Private 
Bank. Furthermore, in the same year, there was also the integration of the commercial 
network of Banca del Garda. In February 2008 there was the integration of 36 branches 
acquired from Intesa Sanpaolo for € 228 million and the acquisition of Banca Italiana di 
Sviluppo (renamed Veneto Banka sh.a. after the operation). In 2009 VB acquired Cassa di 
Risparmio di Fabriano e Cupramontana (CARIFAC), injecting capital as requested by the 
authority, and Banca Apulia. In May 2009 the supervisory found management structure 
excessively centralized on the figure of the CEO, lacks in the credit supply process and the 
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price of the shares was neither assessed through a rigid methodology nor taking into 
consideration the relevant market parameters. For what concerns the assessment of the credit 
exposure and the non-performing loans the NPL amounted to 7.9% of total loans (the system 
average in Italy in December 2008 was 6.2%). In the same period the assessment of the 
supervisory capital revealed an amount of capital of about 2 billion exceeding the minimum 
requirement of €600 million. In 2010 we assisted to the merger of Banca di Bergamo and 
Banca Popolare di Monza e Brianza into Veneto Banca Holding. In the same year emerged 
elements related to the possible existence of an unauthorized control by Veneto Banca on 
BIM (Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e GestioniSpA) in the form of the dominant 
influence and consequently a formal request was made for the acquisition of BIM’s control by 
Veneto Banca. In December 2010, the supervisory approved the operation but asked VB to 
avoid, for the next 24 months, from any further acquisition. Moreover, the supervision sent 
the request to proceed quickly with the integration of the acquired banks and the 
strengthening of capital. At the end, in 2011 there was the merger by incorporation of Banca 
Intermobiliare di Investimenti (BIM) in Veneto Banca. From the 2012 the situation started to 
get worse especially for the severe economic conditions and the bad credit policies of the 
previous years. We highlight an emission of € 350 million of convertible bonds in February 
2013, then readily converted into equity in an operation concluded on 30th June of 2014. From 
the inspections of 2013 resulted operazioni baciate not deducted from the capital for an 
amount of 157 million and credit offering under conflict of interest. The NPL were 18,5% of 
total loans and the capital (2,5 billion) was above the minimum of about 450 million. The 
supervisory asked to start finding a partner and for this task was appointed an advisor. The 
possibility to find a partner gave a negative result, particularly the hypothesis of integration 
between the two Veneto’s bank was closed for problems between the parties. In the 2014 VB 
was subjected to Comprehensive Assessment composed of Asset Quality review and stress 
test. The 26th October of 2014 the stress test was very severe with the bank highlighting a 
capital shortfall of about 714 million. In February 2015 an inspection discovered that Veneto 
Banca did not deduct from the supervisory capital additional 300 million collected with the 
practice of the operazioni baciate and from a deeper analysis further € 56 millions of similar 
operations were discovered. 
This amount had to be immediately deducted and this led to a supervisory capital shortfall of 
the bank. An irregularity typical of the two banks here under analyses was, as already said, the 
practice of operazioni baciate. We use this term when we talk about the phenomenon of the 
issuance of credit by a bank to a subject that commits itself to underwrite instruments of 
capital of the same issuer of the loan. These operations are admitted by the law but are subject 
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to a strict regulation. The most relevant provision is that the amount of money collected with 
this kind of operations must be deducted from the supervisory capital. VB financed clients for 
a greater amount of money and the client had to subscribe the shares of the same bank that 
issued the money using the amount received that exceeded the amount requested (Bilotta, 
2017).  
We can now present the other Veneto’s bank, Banca Popolare di Vicenza. An inspection of 
March 2008 showed bad practices in all the credit process: valuation, monitoring and debt 
recovery. However, the economic context in that period was positive and the non-performing 
loans were 5,5% of total loans and the capital was above the minimum of 1 billion. The bank 
adopted a mechanism to set the shares price that was not related to economic performance and 
was not valuate by any expert. Only in 2011 the bank changed the mechanism and based the 
price on the advice of an external expert. The bank further the intervention of the supervisory 
improved technical profiles (as profitability, credit risk and liquidity) and the governance of 
the group. So, in November 2011 the limit for new acquisitions was taken out but 
nevertheless BPV did not enlarge the group during the years even if many times it considered 
different hypothesis of acquisition. After the little recovery in the economy in the period 
2010-2011 a new recession hit the Italian economy through the sovereign debt crisis. The 
effects were particularly intense on the Veneto bank system with many banks which entered 
in trouble. In this period the bank started to increase the capital (even with not regular 
methods, operazioni baciate) and to reduce the lending operations. The inspection of the 2012 
showed non-performing loans for 293 million and losses for 112 million not reported by the 
financial institution. It is important to know that even BPV used operazioni baciate not 
deducted from the capital in order to increase the capital requirements. Moreover, in 2013 the 
bank acquired own shares for an amount higher than the limit reported from the law. The 
institution created some internal rating models in order to calculate the capital requirements 
but in 2014 this was not accepted by the supervisory for the weaknesses implicit in the model. 
As reported before, BPV made use of operazioni baciate for an amount not deduced from the 
supervisory capital of 500 million. The operation was based on clients which, with the loans 
made by the bank, acquired shares and then it was granted by the institution the reselling of 
the shares for a fixed amount. This could guarantee some profits for the clients. After some 
other inspections, the shares issued through this process amounted to 1,1 billion creating 
losses on capital, due to worsening of clients’ portfolio, for about 1.3 billion 
As it is reported above, it is possible to understand how the banks were affected by the same 
problems in the same period. So, during the 2015 the events of the two institutions become 
more connected. Indeed, during that year both suffered a liquidity problem with BPV that lost 
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2,5 billion of funds while VB about 4 billion. The banks prepared a plan to overcome the 
financial trouble. The plan provided the transformation of the banks in S.p.A. (limited liability 
company), an increase of capital (1 billion for VB and 1,5 billion for BPV) and the market 
listing. The shares price, during the transformation, passed from 48 to 6,3 euro for BPV and 
from 30,5 to 7,3 for VB. In both cases the market offering of shares at price of 0,10 euro was 
not successful. In the first part of 2016 Atlante fund, a fund composed with non-state 
resources, acquired more than 99% of BPV capital and the 97,64% of VB capital. After this 
operation the merger between the banks was not possible due to lack in investors financial 
resources and the exposition on the media led to further decrease of funding. The bank 
required the state intervention, but the European Authorities did not permit it because for 
them, following the BRRD, the resources of the bank were enough to cover the next losses. 
The bank entered officially in financial trouble as declared by the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and the non-presence of the public interest. The banks were put in liquidazione 
coatta amministrativa (LCA) and Intesa San Paolo was found as the acquirer of the two 
banks. However, the non-performing loans were not transferred to the acquirer but to S.G.A., 
a financial institution controlled by the Italian Ministry of Finance, which can manage the 
losses in a medium-long term period. Intesa San Paolo asked to the authorities that the capital 
of the bank would not be touched and to compensate the costs from a restructuring of the 
branches acquired (included the expenses for the personnel) the Department of the Treasury 
gave 4,8 billion to the buyer (Baglioni, 2017). It is important to notice that the Treasury did 
not receive any share and so it cannot receive money back by selling those shares. At the 
same moment, the state granted a guarantee for a maximum of 12,4 billion even if the 
expected value of the losses is much less (about 400 million). The shareholders and owners of 
junior bonds suffered the losses because their titles were not transferred to Intesa San Paolo 
and the major shareholder, the Atlante fund, lost all the sum paid the year before. The FITD 
offset the losses of the junior bonds. From what reported above is possible to understand that 
the operation to solve this case was a rescue conducted by the state.  
 
3.5: Three banks of Romagna 
The three banks here under consideration are: Cassa di Riaparmio di Cesena (CR Cesena), 
Cassa di Risparmio di Rimini (Carim) and Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato (Carismi). 
These banks are the smallest of the institutions analyzed in this chapter. These banks, as in the 
other cases, are reported together because they operated in the same territorial context and 
even because they were subjected to a common conclusion. CR Cesena the 19th May of 2016 
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requested at the Schema Volonario (see chapter 1) the intervention for increase the capital to 
give a solution to financial troubles of the institution (FITD, 2017). The CR Cesena operation 
of recapitalization was based on an increase of capital of 280 million, to reach the minimum 
threshold required to operate. Moreover, it is given to the shareholders of CR Cesena free 
warrants to subscribe a future capital increase of the bank until a maximum of 55 million. The 
23rd September of 2016, after the authorization of the ECB, the scheme became the owner of 
CR Cesena with a stake of 95.3%. Carim and Carismi, respectively the 4th October of 2016 
and the 4th January of 2017, asked to the Schema Volonario to recapitalize them because they 
were not able to collect capital by their own. The scheme to evaluate this case considered the 
hypothesis of a liquidazione coatta amministrativa and the refund by banks of their customers 
of about 2,7 billion with a negative consequence for the banks. So, to solve this situation 
definitively it was supposed the intervention of an acquirer supported by the scheme. 
Different parties were potentially interested but at the end the choice, even from the 
supervisory authority, was Crédit Agricole Cariparma because it gave more certainty in 
respect of other parties to solve the crisis of Carim and Carismi. However, it was considered 
not only the acquisition of these two banks but Crédit Agricole Cariparma was also interested 
in acquiring Caricesena. The buyer bank formally proposed its offer the 19th April 2017. 
Subsequently Crédit Agricole Cariparma presented the need to obtain other resources, 90 
million, to respect the parameters of the offer. So, the 28 July 2017 the scheme approved the 
operation and increased the quote from 700 million to 795 million of which 5 million for the 
functioning of the scheme, the 29th September 2017 the contract between the banks and the 
scheme was signed. The contract provided a spin-off of NPL to the end of reaching a NPLs 
ratio not higher than 9%. This was possible thanks to a disposal of a portfolio of about 286 
million to Algebris fund and the securitization of a portfolio of about 2,8 billion euro. 
Moreover, the scheme recapitalized the banks for 464 million in order to cover the costs for 
the due diligence phase, to align the NPLs value to the disposal price and reaching a CET1 
ratio for the three banks of 10,7%.The recapitalization was 194 million for Carim, 200 million 
for Carismi, 70 for Caricesena. At the and what required by the contract was the disposal of 
the three banks for a sum of 130 million. As we have seen the three banks were rescue by the 
Schema Volonarioto avoid a worse conclusion for these institutions. The intervention of this 
scheme is pretty much like the intervention occurred with TERCAS. However, these banks 
were under analysis because the intervention of the scheme happened after the introduction of 
BRRD and, as we have seen previously, the voluntary part of FITD was mainly introduced in 
order to bypass the legislation about the state aid. In summary, even if there is not a direct 
intervention of the state, we can identify an aid from this if we take into consideration the 
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scheme and the support in order to rescue the banks before any deeper crisis of the 
institutions. 
From these cases we can learn something about the entrance in crisis of an institution and the 
subsequent exit thanks to the intervention of the state. What we showed highlights that the 
banks were not only mined by the economic crisis, with the worsening of their loan portfolio, 
but they were also subject to governance problems or bad strategies which led the bank to 
require the intervention of the authorities. Moreover, we can have a knowledge about the 
methods used to bailout these banks to understand how the authorities act when they intervene 
to rescue an institution. Through this is possible to take some evidences about the specific 
interventions put in practice and this can be useful for further bank bailouts, in order to adopt 
the best methodology when it is time to give financial support to a bank in financial trouble. 
Specifically, for our thesis is relevant also the time threshold used to study the Italian bank 
bailout. This threshold is identified with the intervention of the state in the rescued banks. For 
what concern these banks we pointed out problems of different nature, the repurchase 
agreements of MPS, the strong authority of the foundation on the four banks of center Italy, 
the operazioni baciate and the selling of shares to customers for BPV and VB, the governance 
problems of Carige between the owners and the top management. So, it was not just a matter 
of bad performances suffered because of the crisis but also for actions undertake by the 
managers and owners of the banks. Considering the methods used by the state to intervene, 
we can split these in two ways with a common characteristic. Indeed, MPS and Carige were 
not sold to third parties while the other banks were rescued even with the intervention of a 
third party. About MPS, the state intervened through the capitalization, liquidity and 
guarantees at the beginning of August 2017. For Carige the state authorized the concessions 
of guarantees and liquidity in January 2019 while the capitalization happened mainly with the 
intervention of FITD and the SV at the end of 2019. About the other banks we can say that all 
of these were merged with other banks with the aid of the state. For Carife, Banca delle 
Marche, Banca Etruria and Carichieti after the disposal of the NPL and the constitutions of 
bridge banks, these were acquired by other Italian banking group. Carife was merged in 
BPER Banca the 30th June of 2017 while the other in UBI Banca the 10th May of 2017. The 
National Resolution Fund issued guarantees and a capital increase of 713 million. Similarly, 
VB and BPV were merged in Intesa San Paolo but differently from before the state gave 
money to the buyer but it did not receive any shares back and it allowed guarantees. For the 
three banks of Romagna we can see that they were merged in Crédit Agricole with a 
recapitalization of the Schema Volontario. To conclude, the banks were subject to different 
processes: MPS simply received the state aid, Carige before the financial state support passed 
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through amministrazione controllata, the four banks of center Italy were subjected to 
resolution mechanisms, Veneto's banks were put under liquidazione coatta amministrativa 
and the three banks of Romagna were only sold without any special measure. 
 
3.6: Research design and methodology 
In this section is described the method and the research design adopted to analyze the banks 
above reported. As we have already seen, in this thesis we try to give some knowledge about 
the Italian bank bailout with the main objective to understand if the solutions adopted were 
appropriate and so if they can be used for future bank crisis. Indeed, through the analysis of 
the most recent bank cases is possible to learn how to act to save institutions in financial 
trouble in this new context. The context mentioned is that introduced by the European 
legislator with the BRRD which is the new rule set, defining the boarders where the 
authorities can intervene in case of bank crisis. So, for this, to study the Italian bank bailout 
after the introduction of the BRRD is helpful for the next possible bank rescues. To be more 
precise, in this work we try to extract insights useful for bank rescues, through the 
understanding of the causes which led to bailout Italian banks and pick up economic effects 
on the single institution of the applied rescue methods. In analyzing this, however, we came 
up against problems of different nature. Firstly, the Italian bank bailout after the intervention 
of BRRD is limited to a restrict number of financial institutions and this imply to exclude 
analysis methods which require a large sample to work, as for example econometric models. 
Another critical aspect is that some banks which were object of financial aid are not present 
anymore because they were merged with bank groups. Obviously, this is a problem because it 
is not possible to observe directly on the institution the effect of the state aid before and after 
the intervention. Then, the last problem is that the time from the bailout is not wide and so we 
have a limited number of years to observe the impacts of rescue methods. So, after the 
explanation of the characteristics of our study, the method used to analyze the banks is that 
used by Rovera and De Sury (2016) which studied the bail out of some Italian banks through 
a financial statement analysis. These researchers in their studies analyzed the banks proposed 
in the thesis but with the exclusion of Carismi, Carim and Carice. Moreover, they used a 
timeline common for all the banks based on the last financial statement available for all the 
institution of the group considered. The timeline for the first group is the 2012 (Rovera and 
De Sury, 2016) and the 2015 for the second group (Rovera and De Sury, 2017). This method 
is considered the best to find an answer to our questions and in our study, we consider three 
more institutions that they did not report. We used this method also to analyze the ex-post 
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phase of the bailout. About the phase subsequent the state intervention, we investigate the 
financial statement of the banks remained stand-alone (MPS, Carige) while for the banks 
merged in other banks, we study these last subjects (Intesa San Paolo, UBI banca, Crédit 
Agricole and BPER). To conclude, we can consider the use of this method as an extension of 
the one used by the researches above reported. Indeed, we include more banks, more years 
and we make a step further analyzing the banks after the bailout. To study the effects of 
bailout interventions on banks we analyze their financial statements but, as we explained 
before, the main problem is that many banks merged with others and so it not possible to 
retrieve any direct data for these banks. So, for this the financial statements of the banks 
which acquired the institutions in trouble are analyzed. In this way we try to identify the 
impact of the interventions on specific banks by making a comparison of the performance 
before and after the rescue. To perform our analysis 53 financial statements were studied, 13 
for the banks under financial trouble and 35 for the buyer banks. The period considered is of 
six years for the buyer banks to have a certain amount of years as comparison between the 
past and the ex-post period, so the time goes from the 2013 to 2018. For the rescued banks we 
use the financial statement that we were able to recover and so we start from the 2013 with 
Carim and Carismi while from the 2010 with Carice. The financial statements used were those 
published in the site of the financial institutions. The financial statements used are of the 
banks stand-alone in order to eliminate possible effects of businesses different from the core 
activity here analyzed and because the financial aid was given to the parent company and not 
to subsidiaries. Even for the buyer banks was not analyzed the consolidated financial 
statements for the same reasons. After the collection of the financial statements, we started by 
reporting the data of the balance sheets, income statements and other quantitative information. 
The major data, other than those reported in the balance sheet or income statement, were 
about the employees, the interests and the non-performing loans. For the employees we 
collected their number, specifying the number of managers, and the total cost of wages and 
salary; moreover, we took the cost for statutory auditors and the number of directors. About 
the interests, we reported the data of interest income for debt securities, loans to customers 
and due from banks while for the interest expense the interests from securities, due to 
customers, due to banks and due to Central Banks. For what concern the loans difficult to 
recover we defined the bad loan, the unlikely to pay and non-performing past due for each 
bank. After the collection of these data we started with the reclassification of the liabilities 
highlighting the due to banks, due to customers, the security issued, and the financial liability 
composed of financial liabilities held for trading and financial liabilities designated at fair 
value. Then the shareholder’s equity is the sum of technical reserves, valuation reserves, 
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equity instruments, reserves, share premium, share capital and treasury shares; so basically, 
all the accounts without taking into consideration liabilities and net income, that it is reported 
separately. To better understand their composition, these accounts are in percentage in 
relation to total liabilities and shareholders’ equity. With this reclassification is possible to 
highlight the main source of financing for the bank and if the bank creates income. The same 
approach is used with the assets, reporting the value of due from banks, loans to customers 
and financial assets; the latter are composed of financial assets held for trading, financial 
assets designated at fair value and financial assets available for sale. Due from banks, loans to 
customers and financial assets are reported also in relation with the total assets so that it is 
possible to have a measure of the importance of these accounts for the banks. This structure 
permits to understand how the bank uses the sources of funding and the most relevant assets 
used by institutions in conducting their business. After the reclassification of the balance 
sheet, it is now the time for the reclassification of the income statement. The focus is on the 
interest margin, net interest and other banking income and operating expenses with the 
specification of personnel expenses. The first is given by the difference between interest 
income and interest expenses while the second is the interest income plus: fees and 
commissions, dividends, results of trading and hedging, profits and losses from financial 
assets and liabilities. This permits to understand the income statement composition, the 
impact of costs in relation to the source of profit and the importance of personnel expenses on 
costs. After this reclassification we can pass to describe the impact of cost and income. The 
costs are divided in interest expenses, fee and commission expenses and operating costs; and 
they are reported as percentage calculated in relation to the sum of these costs. This is useful 
to know the impact of the different costs considered. The same approach is conducted with 
the positive components: interest income, fee and commission expenses and dividends. These 
are reported in percentage as the costs and they are used to identify the principal stream of 
income. For what concern the financial assets, it is studied their economic performance 
through the ratio between the sum of profit and losses on trading, fair value adjustments in 
hedge accounting, profit and losses on disposal or repurchase of financial instruments, and the 
total assets. With this ratio is possible to consider the relevance for the institute of the 
financial instruments, and so activities in addition to those based on customers and banks. To 
evaluate the economic performance, it is used the ROE (return on equity). This ratio is 
calculated putting the net income at the numerator while the sum of net income and equity at 
the denominator. With the ratio is possible to understand the profitability of the equity but, 
above all, it is used in order to understand how it changes year by year, assessing the impact 
of government intervention and the financial trouble experienced by the financial institutions 
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here under consideration. Another ratio particularly relevant is the leverage, calculated as total 
assets on equity. This kind of ratio gives us the knowledge about the use of liabilities as 
source of financing for the institutions. With this ratio we can also identify the strategies 
adopted by the banks for financing themselves and the ability to collect equity during the 
period of financial trouble. Fundamentals for a bank are the interests and so in this analysis 
are calculated the interests rate obtained by the institutions. These are found as a ratio 
between the interest income (or expense) and the corresponding account in the balance sheet. 
So, as an example, the interest rate for loans is calculated as the ratio between the income of 
interest loans to customers and the account in balance sheet due from banks. With this 
operation we have the interest rate that the bank used for a year and we can use it to evaluate 
the average interest rate for the period considered. Moreover, it is possible to find the spread, 
the difference between the income interest rate and expenses interest rate, this is particularly 
relevant because it gives indication about the ability of the institution to create profit through 
the application of interest rates. Another point to focus our attention is the personnel cost. As 
said before, we individuated the numbers of employees, of managers and directors. These are 
useful to consider the average cost per year of each of these figures to understand which 
position affects more the costs of a financial institutions. As last point we analyze the loans 
difficult to recover and to identify their impact we calculate a ratio where at numerator there 
are bad loans while at the denominator loans to customers. We made the same with the sum of 
bad loans, unlikely to pay loans and non-performing past due loans always compared with 
loans to customers. This ratio gives us the dimension of the impact of troubled loans in the 
institution. With the sum above mentioned is possible to calculate a ratio called Texas ratio, 
this is calculated comparing the loans in trouble and the equity. When the ratio is above the 
100% the situation is not positive for the bank because this could suffer a loss of the same 
amount, or higher, than the equity.  
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Chapter 4: Presentation of the results 
 
4.1: The banks before the bailout 
In this section firstly we report the results obtained by the researchers already mentioned 
which conducted a financial statement analysis on Carife, Banca delle Marche, Carichieti and 
Banca Etruria (Rovera and De Sury, 2016) and MPS, Carige, BPV and VB (Rovera and De 
Sury, 2017).Through the analysis of these banks the researchers try to find some reasons that 
can explain the financial trouble of the institutions and so the further intervention of the state. 
So, we analyze their conclusions to have a clear idea of the condition of the banks before the 
bailout and the problems which led to a rescue. This is for us a starting point to go deeper and 
understanding the ex-post impact of the bailout on banks involved in the rescue mechanism. 
The researchers find for all the banks a business model too much centered on the traditional 
activity of lending to customers, with a reduced propension of new businesses based on fee 
and commissions rather than interest rates. Another common fact is the increasing of 
operating costs mainly due to the number of employees and this conducts to a decrease of 
efficiency of the banks. Moreover, for what concern Carife, Banca delle Marche, Carichieti 
and Banca Etruria they find that these banks were not capitalized enough to tackle the low 
quality of their assets. Then they analyze the financial statement of bridge banks and they find 
a high reduction of non-performing loans even if the earnings are not enough to cover the 
operating costs. For what concern MPS, Carige, BPV and VB the non-performing loans are a 
component of problem for these institutions presenting the ratios about bad loans worse than 
system. So, we can summarize the problems which affect these banks creating the conditions 
for their financial trouble and the consequent state intervention. In these banks, it is easy to 
find common problems of loans portfolio quality, of a limited efficiency due to operating 
costs led by personnel expenses, of insufficient capitalization in relation to the quality of 
assets. The main aspect on which these problems can be included is the traditional business 
model based on the intermediation with many branches spread in the territory, with increasing 
costs and a competition increased by new models of bank businesses introduced with the new 
technologies.  
Looking at the studies proposed above we did not mentioned Carice, Carismi and Carim and 
so we analyze these banks in order to understand if even these institutions were affected by 






Table 1: Liabilities and equity - percentage in relation to total assets 
  Carim 
        2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Due to banks   
 
  17,26% 17,75% 15,29% 16,21% 16,69% 
Due to customers   
 
  56,82% 54,90% 59,75% 60,27% 57,44% 
Financial liabilities   
 
  15,41% 17,69% 15,57% 16,72% 15,29% 
Securities issued   
 
  15,38% 17,64% 15,44% 16,70% 15,28% 
Equity   
 
  6,84% 7,09% 7,40% 7,47% 11,55% 
Capital and reserves   
 
  6,71% 6,99% 7,28% 7,50% 5,60% 
Net income (loss)       0,14% -0,23% -1,02% -2,32% -4,41% 
  Carice 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Due to banks 9,48% 11,77% 19,68% 13,77% 14,22% 11,64% 4,70% 10,02% 
Due to customers 43,93% 39,63% 37,90% 52,37% 52,74% 61,42% 68,86% 69,09% 
Financial liabilities 34,77% 37,10% 31,16% 24,69% 23,90% 21,46% 13,96% 8,27% 
Securities issued 34,66% 36,96% 31,06% 24,63% 23,81% 21,23% 13,66% 8,26% 
Equity 8,82% 8,72% 8,10% 6,18% 6,53% 8,33% 10,43% 11,06% 
Capital and reserves 5,85% 6,01% 5,55% 4,44% 4,85% 6,06% 10,51% 11,31% 
Net income (loss) 0,13% 0,35% -0,11% 0,30% 0,08% -5,77% -1,80% -2,97% 
  Carismi 
        2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Due to banks   
 
  17,44% 11,37% 17,22% 18,17% 18,29% 
Due to customers   
 
  47,36% 53,25% 51,39% 57,28% 58,78% 
Financial liabilities   
 
  26,27% 25,33% 23,06% 16,52% 11,31% 
Securities issued   
 
  14,14% 18,59% 17,59% 12,17% 8,91% 
Equity   
 
  5,84% 6,67% 7,62% 6,72% 12,28% 
Capital and reserves   
 
  5,03% 5,61% 6,70% 6,82% 5,70% 
Net income (loss)       0,18% 0,27% -2,07% -1,67% -5,95% 
 
About the three banks of Emilia-Romagna we start by analyzing their financial statements. As 
it is possible to notice the main source of financing, for all the banks, is the due to customers 
and for Carim this remain stable during the years while for Carice and Carismi it increases 
during the period considered. The second main source is not so easy to identify, indeed, for 
Carim the due to banks and the financial liabilities have the same weight and they stay stable 
during the time with a percentage comprise between the 15% and the 17%. For Carice and 
Carismi the situation is a little bit different because in the last periods of their activity the due 
to banks became more important than financial liabilities that were the second liability for the 
banks. Then as last observation we can say that the securities issued were the major part of the 
financial liabilities for Carim and Carice while for Carismi there are also other relevant 
securities. We can now focus on the net income and as it possible to see all the banks started 




Table 2: Leverage 
Carim 
      2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
      14,31 14,58 15,66 19,43 14 
Cesena 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
11,17 11,017 12,52 15,45 15,12 39,18 11,58 12,36 
Carismi 
      2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
      16,61 14,4 18,02 19,81 15,8 
 
In the table above there is the evidence of leverage and so the use of source of financing other 
than equity. As we can observe the banks follow a similar path in 2013 and 2014 but in 2015 
Carice has a huge increment because the bank registers a high loss in that year, however the 
following year it decreases a lot.  
 
Table 3: Assets percentage in relation to their total 
  Carim 
        2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Due from banks       1,24% 0,87% 1,41% 0,99% 0,77% 
Due from customers   
 
  62,34% 62,18% 61,50% 65,85% 53,70% 
Financial assets       28,76% 28,59% 27,42% 23,19% 23,31% 
  Carice 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Due from banks 4,28% 4,93% 2,70% 1,45% 2,43% 0,88% 1,75% 1,27% 
Due from customers 80,71% 77,39% 65,86% 68,97% 65,67% 69,37% 69,53% 50,47% 
Financial assets 7,91% 10,13% 24,67% 23,90% 25,25% 20,41% 18,15% 18,61% 
  Carismi 
        2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Due from banks       2,65% 2,89% 1,07% 0,76% 0,80% 
Due from customers   
 
  66,83% 68,09% 70,37% 71,66% 50,73% 
Financial assets       23,57% 20,69% 18,95% 14,65% 11,93% 
 
For what concern the assets we can notice that as previously the main account is in relation to 
customers and it is much higher than the other. Differently from before it is possible to 








Figure 3: Chart of bad debt in relation to due from customer 
 
 
From the chart above it possible to observe the trend of the bad loan compared to due to 
customers. For all the banks it is possible to observe a common path, indeed all the banks saw 
the increase of this ratio but in 2017 there was a huge change, this is due to the intervention of 
the state in that year by taking out the NPL from the banks. 
 
Figure 4: Chart of financial operations 
 
 
In the second chart we can understand the profitability of the financial operations and from 
our data these results are always profitable but with a decreasing path. The 2017 was the 
worst year with lot of losses sign of the huge difficulties of the banks during the period.  
2010  2011   2012     2013     2014     2015   2016     2017  
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We start now to analyze deeply the income statement. As it is possible to notice the operating 
costs for all the banks are the main negative component and they are increasing from 2013 to 
2018. About the operating costs the personnel expenses are the most relevant component for 
these financial institutions. The other relevant component is interest expenses while fee and 
commissions are limited. About the positive components, interest income is the major source 
of income, but it shows a decreasing path along the period considered. Dividends are not 
significant while fee and commission are increasing during the period but these for the 
significant decrement of interest income.  
Table 4: Income statement percentage  
  Carim 
        2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Interest expense       44,91% 36,43% 28,65% 22,72% 12,84% 
Fee and commission    
 
  1,30% 1,46% 1,71% 1,57% 0,97% 
Operating costs   
 





  65,03% 65,26% 65,57% 54,54% 59,15% 
Interest income   
 
  75,96% 73,47% 66,69% 62,40% 56,30% 
Fee and commission   
 
  23,60% 24,68% 31,00% 36,16% 42,07% 
Dividends       0,43% 1,85% 2,31% 1,44% 1,63% 
  Carice 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Interest expense 37,75% 46,86% 47,25% 49,47% 41,44% 29,56% 14,41% 11,30% 
Fee and commission  2,13% 2,01% 3,66% 3,48% 3,00% 2,20% 1,62% 1,94% 
Operating costs 60,13% 51,13% 49,10% 47,05% 55,55% 68,24% 83,97% 86,76% 
Personnel 
cost/operating costs 
72,99% 74,16% 63,21% 76,32% 68,16% 59,46% 65,80% 44,93% 
Interest income 73,68% 74,60% 78,20% 78,19% 74,20% 69,43% 65,09% 52,15% 
Fee and commission 23,76% 23,08% 20,17% 21,40% 24,19% 28,45% 33,12% 46,13% 
Dividends 2,56% 2,32% 1,63% 0,42% 1,60% 2,12% 1,79% 1,72% 
  Carismi 
        2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Interest expense   
 
  43,61% 38,26% 32,19% 24,67% 12,98% 
Fee and commission    
 
  1,05% 1,10% 1,28% 1,00% 0,58% 
Operating costs   
 





  66,56% 68,62% 61,26% 59,86% 59,03% 
Interest income   
 
  68,95% 52,15% 73,11% 63,09% 60,26% 
Fee and commission   
 
  29,14% 46,13% 26,37% 34,98% 38,10% 
Dividends       1,91% 1,72% 0,53% 1,93% 1,64% 
 
Looking at the interests the highest interest rate is coming from customers but for what 
concern the interests expenses the financial liabilities present the highest rates. Looking at the 
year by year interest rates, it is possible to notice that the spread is almost always positive 
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even in the last years of activity, but it has a decreasing trend for all the banks. As we saw 
previously the operating costs are the main negative components and these are led by the 
personnel expenses, so we focus on them now. The number of employees was reducing 
constantly during the period for all the banks and the cost for directors and statutory auditors 
is elevated if it considered that their number is much smaller than employees. However, the 
impact of their wages and salaries is not so elevated in relation to the total and what impact 
more is the overall number of employees. The last point about the income statement analysis 
is about the ROE. For all the financial institutions the ratio is strongly negative with the 2015 





















Table 6: Interest rates 






2010 1,58% -1,74% -0,17% 
2011 1,91% -2,49% -0,58% 
2012 2,30% -2,09% 0,21% 
2013 2,25% -2,08% 0,17% 
2014 1,99% -1,65% 0,34% 
2015 1,94% -1,15% 0,79% 
2016 1,66% -0,79% 0,87% 
2017 1,64% -0,40% 1,24% 
Avg 1,91% -1,55% 0,36% 
Carismi 
2014 2,74% -1,04% 1,69% 
2015 3,10% -0,80% 2,30% 
2016 2,27% -0,63% 1,64% 
2017 1,99% -0,51% 1,47% 
Avg 2,52% -0,75% 1,78% 
Carim 
2013 3,84% -2,15% 1,69% 
2014 2,77% -1,33% 1,44% 
2015 0,03% -0,85% -0,83% 
2016 1,53% -0,61% 0,92% 
2017 1,11% -0,43% 0,67% 
Avg 1,85% -1,08% 0,78% 
Table 5: Average interest rates 
  Average interest income rate 
      From customer From banks Financial assets 
Carice 3,51% 0,48% 0,46% 
Carismi 3,00% 0,77% 1,24% 
Carim 3,05% 0,17% 1,34% 
  Average interest expense rate 
  To customer To banks Finacial liabilities 
Carice -1,03% -0,64% -5,02% 
Carismi -0,57% -0,18% -1,00% 
Carim -1,03% -0,18% -2,59% 
Table 7: ROE 
        2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
San miniato       2,93% 3,93% -37,55% -33,13% -94,06% 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cesena 1,46% 3,89% -1,43% 4,56% 1,19% -226,31% -20,83% -36,76% 
        2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Carim       2,06% -3,32% -15,94% -45,16% -61,82% 
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Table 8: Number and cost of employees 
Carim       2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Employees       746 748 670 674 602 
Managers       7 7 9 9 6 
Employee cost (€)       41010000 44220000 46290000 37201000 27367000 
Directors and auditors’ cost (€)       520000 520000 670000 873000 1284000 
Average employee cost (€)       54973 59118 69090 55194 45460 
Carice 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Employees 738 725 716 957 928 898 868 752 
Managers 8 8 7 9 10 10 11 9 
Employee cost (€) 34784000 33831000 46602000 47211000 45627000 40612000 40764000 32901000 
Directors and auditors’ cost (€) 825000 632000 615000 883000 541000 589000 533000 577000 
Average employee cost (€) 47133 46663 65087 49332 49167 45225 46963 43751 
Carismi         2014 2015 2016 2017 
Employees         642 635 635 613 
Managers   
  
  12 13 13 12 
Employee cost (€)   
  
  34521000 32100000 33686000 32178000 
Directors and auditors’ cost (€)   
  
  1786000 1682000 1486000 1429000 
Average employee cost (€)         53771 50551 53049 52493 
 
To conclude we have a look at the Texas ratio, as we reported in the last part of the previous 
chapter the ratio indicates a bad situation for the bank when it overcome the limit of 1. For 
what reported all the banks here have a dangerous situation and what claim the attention is the 
2017. In this year, the banks received a recapitalization and at the same time the NPL were 
disposed, so this action reduced the total ratio in 2017.  
Table 9: Texas ratio 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Carim       3,32 3,025 3,21 3,11 0,48 
Carice 0,83 0,86 1,01 2,69 2,71 7,58 2,47 0,63 
Carismi       2,77 3,275 3,72 3,24 0,55 
 
To conclude we can individuate the financial troubles which conduct these banks to be saved 
by the intervention of the authorities. The main activity for these banks was related to the 
intermediation with customers and so the business model was a traditional one mainly based 
on the interests as source of income. Another critical point is the quality of the loans that got 
worse quickly in few years, from 2017 to the end of the activity of these banks. The operating 
costs were the main component of these banks and what matter is that these costs were driven 





4.2 Ex-post bailout analysis 
At this point we can now focus our attention to the ex post bailout, to understand the impacts 
of the bailout operations. A special attention goes to Carige because the rescue happened 
recently and there is not the financial statement of 2019 available at the moment on which the 
thesis was written. So, we consider it for a deeper analysis to understand better the situation of 
this institution but not to take evidence about the impact of the state intervention. We use it 
also as comparison for the banks of which we have the financial statements after the rescue. In 
this section we consider the buyer banks (ISP, UBI, CA and BPER) and MPS. We start by 
analyzing the balance sheet as reported below. 
Table 10a: Liabilities and equity - percentage in relation to total assets 
  MPS 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Due to banks 22,99% 21,88% 18,18% 28,23% 20,60% 22,48% 
Due to customers 45,97% 50,83% 53,22% 48,01% 51,52% 54,74% 
Financial liabilities 24,46% 19,35% 19,46% 16,59% 16,35% 11,47% 
Securities issued 18,90% 16,53% 16,94% 14,52% 15,41% 10,67% 
SH equity 3,23% 5,71% 4,99% 10,97% 9,66% 6,75% 
Capital and reserves 3,85% 6,17% 5,09% 6,01% 9,85% 7,12% 
Net income -0,85% -2,98% 0,26% -2,58% -2,21% -0,09% 
  Carige 
Due to banks 33,85% 16,13% 15,43% 15,37% 21,29% 23,58% 
Due to customers 22,40% 37,14% 37,47% 51,69% 49,56% 54,22% 
Financial liabilities 34,26% 35,45% 32,08% 21,68% 16,61% 10,22% 
Securities issued 30,61% 31,29% 29,65% 19,71% 15,02% 10,06% 
SH equity 11,84% 9,17% 10,52% 9,21% 10,49% 8,90% 
Capital and reserves 9,13% 8,78% 8,08% 9,19% 8,52% 9,45% 
Net income -6,37% -2,53% -0,68% -1,24% -1,60% -1,29% 
  ISP 
Due to banks 27,24% 26,58% 29,72% 31,06% 34,10% 30,60% 
Due to customers 26,29% 27,68% 29,42% 32,92% 33,55% 39,45% 
Financial liabilities 32,78% 31,59% 27,32% 22,67% 19,09% 17,65% 
Securities issued 29,88% 27,43% 23,55% 18,95% 16,23% 14,55% 
SH equity 11,11% 9,77% 9,57% 9,32% 8,56% 8,23% 
Capital and reserves 3,20% 3,06% 2,91% 2,80% 2,47% 2,55% 





Table 10b: Liabilities and equity - percentage in relation to total assets 
  UBI 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Due to banks 32,86% 25,81% 22,39% 27,01% 13,90% 13,82% 
Due to customers 9,77% 9,53% 10,40% 20,49% 52,97% 54,20% 
Financial 
liabilities 
43,46% 51,51% 53,10% 39,88% 22,72% 21,61% 
Securities issued 40,87% 49,27% 51,25% 38,55% 22,30% 21,18% 
SH equity 12,39% 12,79% 12,20% 11,13% 7,68% 6,84% 
Capital and 
reserves 
6,21% 6,21% 6,41% 6,38% 5,12% 4,44% 
Net income 0,10% -1,24% 0,17% -0,62% -0,01% 0,38% 
  CA 
Due to banks 14,75% 16,50% 11,60% 13,80% 15,85% 14,31% 
Due to customers 43,43% 43,98% 51,14% 53,09% 53,15% 55,75% 
Financial 
liabilities 
26,37% 23,37% 21,12% 17,41% 16,39% 14,75% 
Securities issued 25,88% 22,88% 20,86% 17,20% 16,26% 14,64% 
SH equity 10,64% 10,62% 10,86% 10,76% 10,78% 10,58% 
Capital and 
reserves 
4,04% 4,05% 4,18% 4,11% 3,95% 3,91% 
Net income 0,31% 0,33% 0,52% 0,46% 0,43% 0,45% 
  BPER 
Due to banks 21,52% 16,87% 17,17% 23,34% 27,49% 27,81% 
Due to customers 41,87% 49,37% 50,00% 50,96% 50,49% 53,31% 
Financial 
liabilities 
25,28% 21,00% 19,49% 14,31% 11,09% 8,35% 
Securities issued 18,54% 17,03% 17,26% 13,41% 10,72% 8,09% 
SH equity 8,32% 9,40% 9,11% 8,68% 7,77% 6,90% 
Capital and 
reserves 
6,82% 7,39% 7,22% 6,98% 6,22% 5,48% 
Net income -0,03% 0,03% 0,32% 0,03% 0,35% 0,52% 
 
 
Table 11: Leverage 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Carige 18,27 15,07 10,15 12,55 11,24 13,15 
MPS 42,08 36,65 19,06 11,9 13,42 14,51 
ISP 9,89 9,92 9,78 10,29 10,51 11,2 
UBI 8,01 8,66 8,08 9,52 13,05 13,84 
CA 9,13 9,13 8,79 8,91 8,92 9,06 
BPER 12,3 13,89 10,87 11,3 12,85 13,47 
 
Starting with Carige we can see how the first source of funding is due to customer with an 
increasing path for the years reported. The second source is not so easy to individuate because 
it changes during the years, indeed we observe a reduction in financial liabilities and an 
increase in due to banks. During all the period the bank suffered losses. About the MPS we 
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remember that the intervention started at the end of 2016 and so we look at the financial 
statements of 2017 to understand possible effects of the intervention on the institution. Firstly, 
the due to customers remains the main source of financing for all the periods but we do not 
register any change of importance even in the other accounts. The result of the period is 
negative for many years but in 2018 it is close to zero after two years of bigger losses. We can 
now pass to the buyers and for ISP we remember that it acquired the banks in 2017. We notice 
that the due to banks and due to customers are quite similar for all the period except for 2018 
where the due to customers are higher than due to banks. The financial liabilities follow a 
trend which is decreasing for all the period without any change in 2017. The net income 
remains positive after the loss of 2013, to notice that it increases in 2017 and 2018 (always in 
relation to the other liabilities). About UBI and BPER we remember that even for them the 
purchase happened in 2017. For what concern UBI, for first we can observe that the main 
liability was financial instruments, but it changed drastically in 2017 where the first source 
become due to customers. Just to understand the change, between the 2013 and 2016 the 
average of due to customer was 12,55% while in the next two years it becomes 53,58%. The 
net income in 2018 turns return positive after 2 years of losses. About BPER we can consider 
a stability of due to customer around 50% and it is also the main liability for the bank. The 
due to banks change a little in 2017 and the financial liabilities have a decreasing path for all 
the period. The net income remains positive for different years with an increase in the last 
two. Finally, we can consider Crédit Agricole, even for this institute the purchase was in 
2017. The composition of the liabilities for this bank find as main source of financing due to 
customers for all the periods, while financial instruments started decrease for all the period 
and in 2018 converge to due to banks. Even for the net income the situation is table for the 
period. 
About the leverage, we can observe the high value for MPS in 2013 and 2014 but then it 
reduced even before the state intervention. About the other banks it is interesting to notice that 
for all the banks the 2015 was the year with the lowest leverage and after that year it started to 
increase. It is interest to notice that it is not necessary to have abnormal high leverage to enter 
in crisis because if we look at Carige, it has not a level so high in regard the other banks. The 
bank with the lowest leverage is CA while UBI between the 2016 and the 2017 increases the 
leverage of 3,53 much more than the other periods. Studying the balance sheet, we can 
observe that for MPS the main assets are due from customers for all the years, then it comes 
due from banks and as lasts financial assets. It possible to confirm that the sources stay stable 
for importance along all the period and it does not seem to observe any substantial change 
after the rescue. For Carige the main account is due from customers and this importance 
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increases during all the period, this is due to a reduction in due from banks and financial 
assets because due from customers stays around 15 billion in 2017-2018. Looking at the 
buyer banks, for ISP the composition stay stable for all the period with an increase of due 
from banks along all the period and a similar situation is possible to find in BPER but here in 
2017 and 2018 the due from banks is higher than the other periods. UBI presents a situation 
where it is possible to observe a deep increase in due from customers in 2017 maintained in 
2018, this is due to an increase of due to customers which passed from 37 billion in 2016 to 
more than 90 in 2017. For what concern CA it is possible to confirm that the bank increased 
the due from customers in 2018 after a long period of constant due to customers around 28 
billion euro, reaching 40 billion. Meanwhile, the due from banks decreases as the financial 
liabilities in 2018. So, the change in composition is led by all three accounts. 
Table 12: assets percentage in relation to their total 
  MPS 
   2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Due from banks 13,30% 21,56% 21,17% 21,95% 19,25% 23,10% 
Due from customers 65,24% 56,89% 58,75% 58,86% 55,19% 58,28% 
Financial assets 13,81% 13,98% 11,75% 12,24% 12,30% 10,48% 
  ISP 
Due from banks 4,26% 4,85% 5,09% 7,33% 9,09% 8,80% 
Due from customers 54,93% 52,46% 51,74% 50,30% 51,55% 51,69% 
Financial assets 32,58% 34,53% 35,19% 35,22% 32,41% 32,13% 
  UBI 
Due from banks 18,25% 18,95% 21,89% 15,45% 5,99% 8,12% 
Due from customers 34,05% 31,45% 30,95% 46,80% 73,40% 75,09% 
Financial assets 28,73% 31,52% 28,45% 22,41% 12,04% 8,23% 
  Carige 
Due from banks 24,54% 17,94% 14,55% 7,30% 11,11% 6,79% 
Due from customers 46,29% 54,74% 56,12% 69,72% 65,98% 72,10% 
Financial assets 16,23% 12,20% 15,57% 9,22% 8,50% 8,80% 
  CA 
Due from banks 6,59% 6,28% 5,58% 8,27% 10,85% 5,55% 
Due from customers 72,55% 71,40% 70,98% 72,10% 66,33% 80,00% 
Financial assets 10,59% 12,32% 11,52% 10,41% 11,47% 5,31% 
  BPER 
Due from banks 2,57% 2,82% 1,77% 2,05% 4,22% 4,68% 
Due from customers 75,32% 72,41% 71,34% 70,04% 67,02% 74,68% 





From the chart below is possible to have some knowledge about the path of the ratio between 
bad loans and due from customers. It is interesting to highlight that Carige, MPS and BPER 
have a similar starting point but BPER decreases the ratio for all the period. Differently, MPS 
and Carige see increasing their ratio until to reach the top in 2016. For both banks we can see 
how their ratio approaches at the other financial institutions. ISP and CA after an increase in 
the first years recover after 2016 while UBI it is the only one which shows an increasing path 
when the other banks are having an opposite trend but it decreases a little in 2018.   
 
Figure 5: Chart of bad debt in relation to due from customer 
 
The net result of financial operations is showed in the next chart. MPS reports high returns in 
2015 and 2017, but in 2018 there is a high decrease even if it is not negative. Carige shows a 
stability but in the last two years considered even for this institution we see a big loss. The 
other banks, without UBI, show a quite stable trend in the last years except BPER which in 
2015 reach a return higher than the other years. As we can notice, UBI sees a decrement in 













Table 13a: Income statement percentage 
BPER 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Interest income 72,46% 70,84% 67,36% 65,77% 62,88% 60,00% 
Fee and commission 24,14% 26,90% 30,85% 33,06% 34,80% 37,32% 
Dividends 4,72% 2,36% 3,40% 2,26% 1,79% 1,17% 
Interest expense 49,90% 36,24% 26,30% 22,00% 21,36% 18,39% 
Fee and commission 3,44% 2,76% 2,19% 2,36% 2,62% 3,03% 
Operating costs 46,66% 61,00% 71,52% 75,64% 76,01% 78,58% 
Personnel cost/operating costs 60,74% 57,04% 53,81% 51,71% 53,75% 52,44% 
MPS 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Interest income 71,80% 69,29% 63,99% 60,29% 58,54% 55,40% 
Fee and commission 26,50% 28,80% 33,69% 38,44% 40,68% 42,09% 
Dividends 1,70% 1,90% 2,32% 1,28% 0,78% 2,52% 
Interest expense 54,26% 46,52% 38,86% 31,50% 20,25% 18,99% 
Fee and commission 5,61% 5,44% 5,60% 4,80% 6,21% 5,37% 
Operating costs 40,13% 48,04% 55,54% 63,70% 73,54% 75,64% 
Personnel cost/operating costs 54,22% 58,91% 55,08% 55,27% 55,33% 54,87% 
Carige 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Interest income 76,15% 73,76% 67,33% 63,96% 61,02% 57,14% 
Fee and commission 19,03% 23,03% 28,68% 33,55% 36,43% 39,97% 
Dividends 6,00% 4,58% 5,44% 3,88% 4,07% 4,78% 
Interest expense 62,11% 55,29% 45,27% 33,10% 26,73% 24,20% 
Fee and commission 6,18% 5,19% 4,48% 4,08% 3,62% 4,54% 
Operating costs 31,71% 39,52% 50,24% 62,81% 69,64% 71,26% 




Table 13b: Income statement percentage 
ISP 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Interest income 64,64% 59,24% 52,02% 55,26% 53,19% 46,25% 
Fee and commission 20,25% 22,43% 24,33% 29,24% 31,25% 31,46% 
Dividends 15,11% 18,33% 23,65% 15,50% 15,56% 22,29% 
Interest expense 58,29% 57,40% 48,56% 41,40% 29,57% 26,84% 
Fee and commission 4,03% 4,23% 5,14% 6,66% 6,69% 8,80% 
Operating costs 37,68% 38,37% 46,30% 51,95% 63,74% 64,36% 
Personnel cost/operating costs 40,36% 54,20% 51,74% 50,49% 48,03% 54,95% 
UBI 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Interest income 78,24% 75,72% 71,84% 63,65% 56,49% 53,93% 
Fee and commission 6,03% 5,63% 7,67% 22,95% 40,50% 42,51% 
Dividends 15,73% 18,65% 20,49% 13,39% 3,01% 3,55% 
Interest expense 39,64% 33,70% 27,08% 19,80% 18,65% 11,68% 
Fee and commission 5,15% 4,98% 5,82% 5,19% 6,03% 6,68% 
Operating costs 55,21% 61,33% 67,10% 75,01% 75,32% 81,64% 
Personnel cost/operating costs 65,45% 69,92% 61,14% 57,60% 58,45% 60,42% 
CA 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Interest income 69,22% 66,22% 62,69% 57,83% 54,55% 47,34% 
Fee and commission 29,22% 31,45% 34,31% 38,47% 41,76% 48,05% 
Dividends 1,57% 2,33% 2,99% 3,70% 3,69% 4,62% 
Interest expense 35,85% 34,77% 25,71% 17,55% 15,26% -0,84% 
Fee and commission 1,82% 2,14% 2,33% 2,55% 4,46% 3,51% 
Operating costs 62,33% 63,09% 71,96% 79,90% 80,29% 97,33% 
Personnel cost/operating costs 61,15% 64,92% 58,90% 56,73% 54,57% 56,20% 
 
From the table we can see the restated income statement for the banks. Looking at MPS is 
possible to individuate some trends in the source of income and expenses. Firstly, a 
decreasing in importance of interest income, even if it is the first source of income, and an 
increasing of fee and commission income. For the expenses we can say that the operating 
costs are the main component, however this is not due to an increase of cost but above all to a 
reduction in interest expenses during all the period with an acceleration in 2017. The main 
component of operating costs, as it is reported, is personnel expenses. Carige can be compared 
to MPS for interest income and fee and commission income with an increasing of the first and 
a decreasing of the second. Even for the negative components there is a path like MPS but 
smoother than MPS. About ISP, we see a certain convergence between the positive 
components and this convergence is not due to a decrease in absolute value of interest income 
but to an increase of dividends and fee and commission in 2018. For the expenses, the 
situation is relevant because after the 2017 we assist to an increase in importance of operating 




Table 14: Interest rates 
ISP Expense Income Spread CA Expense Income Spread 
2013 1,35% 1,96% 0,61% 2013 0,82% 2,22% 1,40% 
2014 1,09% 2,05% 0,96% 2014 0,76% 1,97% 1,21% 
2015 0,84% 1,41% 0,57% 2015 0,62% 1,86% 1,24% 
2016 0,75% 1,23% 0,47% 2016 0,42% 3,37% 2,96% 
2017 0,61% 1,08% 0,47% 2017 0,34% 1,23% 0,89% 
2018 0,59% 1,23% 0,64% 2018 0,40% 1,69% 1,29% 
AVG 0,87% 1,49% 0,62% AVG 0,56% 2,06% 1,50% 
UBI Expense Income Spread BPER Expense Income Spread 
2013 0,84% 0,83% -0,01% 2013 1,38% 2,73% 1,34% 
2014 0,26% 0,96% 0,70% 2014 1,02% 2,45% 1,43% 
2015 0,49% 0,58% 0,09% 2015 0,64% 1,75% 1,12% 
2016 0,00% 0,66% 0,66% 2016 0,48% 1,55% 1,07% 
2017 0,00% 0,56% 0,56% 2017 0,48% 1,40% 0,92% 
2018 0,00% 0,61% 0,61% 2018 0,46% 1,21% 0,75% 
AVG 0,27% 0,70% 0,43% AVG 0,74% 1,85% 1,10% 
MPS Expense Income Spread Carige Expense Income Spread 
2013 -1,91% 2,24% 0,33% 2013 -2,18% 3,05% 0,88% 
2014 -1,86% 2,08% 0,21% 2014 -1,76% 2,91% 1,16% 
2015 -1,54% 2,07% 0,53% 2015 -1,17% 2,63% 1,46% 
2016 -1,27% 2,35% 1,08% 2016 -0,96% 2,37% 1,40% 
2017 -1,10% 2,14% 1,04% 2017 -0,64% 2,30% 1,66% 
2018 -1,00% 2,05% 1,05% 2018 -0,58% 1,91% 1,33% 
AVG -1,45% 2,16% 0,71% AVG -1,21% 2,53% 1,31% 
 
It is relevant to say that the percentage calculated in 2017 was purified from the state 
intervention present in the income statement where it was accounted a contribution of 3,5 
billion, indeed the year later the percentage values are pretty similar to 2017. The personnel 
expenses participate to operating costs always in the same manner without evident changes 
and UBI sees a particular increase of fee and commission in 2016 and 2017. The interest 
expenses decrease a lot during the period while we observe a corresponding increase in 
operating costs and looking at the absolute value, we can say that this is ether for interest 
expenses and for operating income. For what concern CA we can say that there is a 
convergence in the positive income components and interest income and fee and commission 
are about the same amount in 2018. For the negative components we observe the influence of 
the operating costs and the value extremely high in 2018 but this is due to an increase of 
operating costs but also for the interest expense that result positive because hedging 
instruments differential goes into the interest rates. Finally, we can consider the BPER. This 
institution shows a decreasing trend for what concern the interest income and an increasing 
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one for fee and commission. The composition, for the expenses, changes during the period 
and we observe an increase trend of operating cost for all the period and a decrease of interest 
expenses 
Now we can study the interest rates applied for the buyer banks during the period. The interest 
rate expenses for ISP are decreasing while the interest rate income is raising in 2018 as the 
spread. About UBI we can consider in the last three years a spread very similar with interest 
rate expense close to zero. CA in 2017 sees a spread much lower than the year before but then 
increased in 2018 even if it is under the average of the period. BPER differently from the 
other banks shows a decreasing path in spread as in the interest income while the interest 
expenses are stable in the last three years. For MPS we note a spread close very limited in the 
first three years considered while in the last three we have a percentage stable at 1%. Carige 
shows a spread always positive and near to the 1,5% from the 2015 to the 2018.  
 
Table 15: ROE 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
ISP -9,84% 3,00% 6,43% 4,05% 10,07% 7,81% 
UBI 2,24% -7,01% 1,11% -9,16% 6,90% 4,62% 
CA 2,81% 2,98% 4,53% 4,14% 3,84% 4,09% 
BPER 0,02% -0,36% 0,33% 3,41% 0,40% 4,27% 
MPS -35,94% -108,98% 4,89% -30,68% -29,62% -1,35% 
Carige -116,31% -38,17% -6,86% -15,59% -17,95% -16,99% 
 
From the analysis of the ROE is possible to conclude that ISP in 2017 has an increase respect 
the other years and the same we can say for UBI. CA presents a stable situation, BPER 
instead has a high variability so it is difficult to assess the increase of roe in 2018. For MPS 
the situation is going better while Carige is not able to recover remaining stable at the level of 




Table 16: Number and cost of employees 
 ISP 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Employees 22975 25216 27.430 30080 33569 44497 
Managers 473 480 487 487 574 615 
Employee cost (€'000) 1218000 1375000 1489000 1665000 1883000 2514000 
Directors and statury cost (€'000) 8000 8000 8000 6000 6000 8000 
Average employee cost (€'000) 53,01 54,53 54,28 55,35 56,09 56,5 
 UBI 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Employees 1428 1444 1475 4.453 16033 16456 
Managers 141 135 138 183 293 289 
Employee cost (€'000) 128725 140.427 149.901 330.092 833.525 950.114 
Directors and statury cost (€'000) 6.824 6.388 6.502 7.466 6.574 6.259 
Average employee cost (€'000) 90,14 97,25 101,63 74,13 51,99 57,74 
  CA 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Employees 5955 5774 5407 5030 5003 6644 
Managers 78 74 68 69 65 86 
Employee cost (€'000) 315829 305.579 295.385 279.769 291.540 372.615 
Directors and statury cost (€'000) 1048 1.173 1.196 1.150 1.158 1.589 
Average employee cost (€'000) 53,04 52,92 54,63 55,62 58,27 56,08 
 BPER 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Employees 4466 7026 6871 6741 6848 6989 
Managers 115 158 155 153 149 147 
Employee cost (€'000) 270958 380011 378799 377805 393577 419206 
Directors and statury cost (€'000) 4095 5813 4036 4024 3956 4058 
Average employee cost (€'000) 60,67 54,09 55,13 56,05 57,47 59,98 
MPS 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Employees 25.633 24.328 23.092 22.430 21.292 20.250 
Managers 328 285 278 266 234 219 
Employee cost (€'000) 1196639 1183832 1141210 1109713 1088906 1008569 
Directors and statury cost (€'000) 1981 1772 2212 2565 2304 1596 
Average employee cost (€'000) 46,68 48,66 49,42 49,47 51,14  49,81 
Carige 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Employees 2.464 2.463 2.901 4.339 4.144 3.883 
Managers 51 52 49 55 54 45 
Employee cost (€'000) 120296 110989 130626 203212 195602 183163 
Directors and statury cost (€'000) 3110 5062 6028 5017 3399 3670 
Average employee cost (€'000) 48,82 45,06 45,03 46,83 47,2 47,17 
 
We can now observe the employees’ situation of the banks. For MPS we observe a decrease 
of employees during this period of time as well as the number of managers and consequently 
a decrease in the employee costs. About Carige we can notice an high increase in the number 
of employees and this is due because the personnel of other group companies is included in 
the number. In the periods 2017 2018 all the banks increase the numbers of employees and 
managers as it is expected after the merger of banks, the only exception is BPER that 
maintains a stable number during the period. Even if the salary total cost increases the 
compensation per worker stays stable for all the banks during the period with the exclusion of 
UBI which reduces its compensation for a single worker in 2017 2018.  The cost for directors 
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and statutory auditors is elevated if we consider that for a single director the compensation is 
much higher than a simple employee but as absolute is not so impacting. What affect more the 
operating costs is the number of employees. 
 
Table 17: Texas ratio 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
ISP 27% 33% 36% 35% 28% 25% 
UBI 15% 15% 14% 29% 71% 56% 
CA 35% 45% 45% 42% 34% 23% 
BPER 80% 99% 127% 85% 70% 37% 
Carige 153% 168% 132% 223% 139% 182% 
MPS 444% 411% 241% 143% 128% 82% 
 
At the end we consider the Texas ratio, MPS in 2018 goes under the 100% while Carige for 
all the period maintains a high value. BPER sees a decrement for all the last four years as ISP 
and CA but with lower rate. UBI is the only who sees an increment in 2017 even if it recovers 
in 2018 but the value is the highest of the period considered. 
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Chapter 5: Comment and conclusions 
It is time now to comment the results reported in the previous chapter to understand what the 
effects of these bailout interventions on the institutions object of rescue were. As declared 
before in this thesis the main object is to analyze the causes which led some Italian banks to 
financial troubles requiring the intervention of the State and try to individuate if these causes 
were solved. Moreover, by analyzing the financial statements of the banks we observe if there 
were any change inside them after the bailout to understand the impact of the rescue methods. 
We remember that the year that we take as threshold is the 2017 because all the acquisitions 
were made in that period and we consider this year even for MPS because the intervention 
happened just few days before the yearend (see chapter 3). Firstly, we start giving a summary 
of the results obtained to have a clear picture of what happened on the banks after the 
intervention of the state. About MPS we register in 2018 an increase in net income that it is 
close to zero after many years of losses and for ISP an increase in importance of due to 
customers in relation to other liabilities always in 2018. As ISP, UBI was seriously impacted 
by a high increase in due to customers but from the 2017 the net income turns to be positive 
after two years of losses. To what concern the other banks, CA, BPER and Carige, there are 
not significant changes on liabilities. MPS decreases the leverage but this can be not led by 
the state intervention because there is a high decreasing path even before the 2017. What is 
relevant about the level of debt is the increase in leverage of UBI since the 2017. If we look at 
the assets there are not significant changes except UBI which presents a different composition 
with a high level of due from customer in respect to previous years. CA presents higher level 
of due from customer thanks to an increase of this account but also from a decrease of 
financial assets and due from banks. About the bad loans we can say that we observe a 
declining path even before the intervention of the state except for UBI which is the only one 
who increases the ratio in the last periods. The net results of financial operations give us 
information about the operations other than the lending to customers and the main evidences 
are a decrease of Carige in 2017 and 2018 leading to negative results and the same we can say 
about MPS even if the results are not negative. Even UBI in 2018 suffers a decrease in this 
component after many years of positive results. For the income statement, we see that MPS 
has a decrease in the interest expenses for all the period but especially in the 2017 and 2018, 
the same happened to ISP which registers a decrease of importance of interest expenses and 
an increase of operating costs. This effect is driven either for a reduction in interest expense 
and for an increase of operating costs. UBI in 2016 sees an increase of negative fee and 
commission and this enforced in 2017. For the other banks we can observe a general trend of 
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increase in importance of operating costs and decrease of interest expenses as well as an 
increase of positive fee and commission and a decrease of interest income. About the interest 
rate and spreads, we can observe how BPER is the only institution that has a decreasing path 
of spread while the other banks maintain their spreads even if both the interest income rate 
and the interest expense rate have a decreasing path. Looking at the ROE we can observe that 
in 2017 ISP increases its ratio and UBI also after many years of negative or low ROE. Even 
MPS gets better in 2018 while Carige is not able to recover alone. The buyer banks, as it is 
possible to expect, increase the number of employees in 2017 2018 except for BPER, 
moreover we have reduction of cost per employee for UBI. Finally, about the Texas ratio we 
can see an improvement of MPS in 2018 while a decrement of performance for UBI.  
 
After the indication of the most relevant findings we can now understand if the financial 
trouble of the bailout banks were solved or if were transmitted to buyer banks. The main 
problem for the rescued banks were to be focused too much on a traditional business model 
and so high reliance on loan interests of customers. Looking at the customer asset and 
liabilities we can confirm a trend of due to customer increasing for all the period considered 
and so not specifically in 2017.The exception is UBI which increases in this year a lot the 
dependence from due to customer. For the assets part we highlight a high increase for UBI in 
2017 while a smaller one for CA in 2018, the other banks instead are having for all the period 
a stability of this asset. Then we look at the interest expenses and for all the period there is a 
drop in the interest expenses, but we signal a substantial decrease for MPS and ISP in 2017 
and UBI in 2016. Even for the interest income there is a reduction of importance for these 
banks but there is not any relevant change after the acquisitions. The decreasing of interest 
income and expenses is confirmed even by the interest rates. So, we can conclude that in 2017 
UBI was the bank who increases more the liabilities and assets from customers while CA sees 
only a slight increase on due from customer. For the interest expense MPS, UBI and ISP 
experiment a decrease after the 2017. We can affirm that UBI suffered a change in the 
composition of asset and liabilities about customers around the 2017 and CA in 2018 for what 
concern due from customer. About the interest expense MPS, UBI and ISP decrease the 
relevance of this account. We can say that UBI is going to a composition of asset and liability 
that put importance on customer typical of a traditional business. We can notice also that we 
assist to a reduction on interest income but this is followed by a corresponding decrease in 
interest expenses and so the income from interest is still positive, moreover the banks are 
changing the composition of their assets with less weight on customers but more on fee and 
commissions. This strategy seems to be not disturbed by the intervention of the state. Another 
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relevant point about the bailout banks was the operating costs and more generally the costs 
due to a high number of employees. ISP is hit by an increasing of operating costs after the 
2017 as well as UBI in the same period, CA instead is hit in 2018. However, the general trend 
of all the period for the banks is an increasing level of operating costs but this is mainly due to 
a reduction of interest expenses as in the case of MPS. Moreover, even after the acquisition 
and the increase of number of employees the banks were able to maintain the personnel 
expenses at the same level of previous years in relation to operating costs. So, we can say that 
after the 2017 ISP, BPER and CA experimented a high value of operating costs however all 
the other institutions have a growing path for what concern these costs and so we cannot 
confirm with certainty that the rescue was the main driver for these costs. The loans difficult 
to recover were another problem of the bailout banks and so we look at the bad debt in order 
to understand if this pattern were transferred to the acquiring banks or maintained in MPS. 
About this fact we can consider that after the 2016, so before the acquisitions, the banks 
started to decrease the impact of bad loans and it did not increase after the purchase, this is 
what we expect because the contracts did not contemplate the transfer of the NPL. However, 
UBI is different from the other because it increases the presence of bad loans until the 2017 
with a slight recover in 2018. So, in general it is possible to affirm that the solutions adopted 
by the authorities were efficient in granting the restraint of the non-performing loans. Another 
important problem for the banks entered in trouble was the elevated level of debt with a 
corresponding low level of capitalization. As we reported before all the banks suffered an 
increase of leverage after the 2015 but the bank which showed a higher increase after the 
2017 was UBI. We can conclude that the model focused on a traditional business, typical of 
the rescued banks, is not transferred to the buyer banks because the path of a business 
centered on other sources rather than the only intermediation activity is going on even after 
the bailout. The only bank which shows a changing from this path is UBI. About the 
operating costs we cannot determine precisely if they increased because even if we find some 
operating costs which increased in respect of other negative income component, all the banks 
are undergoing an increase of operating costs. About the low quality of the loans we can say 
that this is not transferred except for UBI that, as we said before, has different pattern from 
the other banks about the bad loans. About the level of capitalization, we do not observe any 
strong change in the level of debt and what reported by UBI in 2017 it is not enough to reach 
some conclusion about the debt of this institution. 
As we saw UBI seems the only institution which suffered more in the period of the 
acquisitions and it comes naturally to ask why it is the only bank with high changes in respect 
to the others. To analyze this difference, we can start by understanding the banks which has 
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acquired. The banks acquired were Carichieti, Banca delle Marche and Banca Etruria, but 
their resolution was linked with another institution, Carife, then acquired by BPER. These 
rescued banks are inside the same project of rescue, so another relevant question is to 
understand why UBI incurred in some changes while BPER was much less touched by the 
question. Looking at the UBI strategy we notice that this bank at the end of 2016 and at the 
beginning of 2017 acquired five banks under the project banca unica. The banks under 
consideration are Banca Popolare Commercio, Industria Spa and Banca Regionale Europea 
Spa in 2016 while the 20th February of 2017 with Banca Popolare di Bergamo Spa, Banco di 
Brescia Spa, Banca di Valle Camonica Spa, Banca Popolare di Ancona Spa and Carime Spa. 
Considering this, it is not so easy to conduct the changes suffered by UBI to the intervention 
of the state which rescued Banca Etruria, Carichieti and Banca delle Marche. To conclude 
UBI appeared the most affected by the intervention of the state but all the acquisitions other 
than that of the banks under bailout mined the possible connections between the changes 
suffered and the state interventions. 
In this study we can observe several limitations. The first is the fact that we studied the 
impacts on these banks only for two years and so we are possibly missing some impacts that 
can emerge in the next future. Then, if the method chosen has the advantage to be simple to 
apply and to give evidence of the main changes happened, it has also negative aspects. The 
major is the difficulty to go deep in the analysis, without giving a precise measure of how 
much they were affected by government measures. Moreover, it should be relevant to know 
the impact of the different rescue methods but for the low number of banks involved, for the 
fact that the rescued banks were dissolved and for the method applied we were not able to 
observe it. Another critical aspect appeared when we studied the three banks of Romagna, 
especially for Carim and Carismi, because we were not able to collect more years due to the 
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